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AN EVALUATION OF CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING:  




The purpose of this study is to identify problems that contingency contracting 
officers have faced in past contingencies, what problems they are facing in current 
contingencies, and what problems they are likely to face in the future as the nature of 
warfare changes in order to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.  This effort was 
accomplished by conducting a historical analysis of contingency contracting from 1775 
up to today’s Operation Iraqi Freedom, with special emphasis placed on contingencies 
between 1990 and 2005.  An evaluation of the generations of war was conducted to 
determine what challenges contingency contracting officers may face in the future. 
The results of this study revealed four main problem areas that hinder a 
contingency contracting officer’s efficiency and effectiveness.  These four areas are (1) 
Policy, (2) Planning, (3) Organization, and (4) Training.  This study then analyzed each 
area to identify how it was hindering the contingency contracting officer.  
Recommendations ranged from developing a Joint Contingency Contracting Operations 
Manual to adopting a new contingency contracting structure based on the Yoder Three-
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While the term contingency contracting was coined only a decade or two ago, the 
United States military has been contracting out logistical support for its military forces in 
different degrees in both domestic and overseas operations with varying levels of success 
since 1775.  Early attempts at contracting logistics support for military operations 
sometimes brought the expedition to ruins, but since World War II, contingency 
contracting has generally proved an integral part of the military’s operational capabilities. 
Today, we are engaged in a new generation of war.  This generation of war is 
described as the Fourth Generation War (4GW) in which, one or more entities is fighting 
against a common adversary, as in Iraq and Afghanistan where different factions and 
insurgents are battling United States forces.  Military forces have witnessed a steady 
increase in the frequency of contingency operations.  As we continue to progress further 
into the 4GW, the pace of contingency operations is unlikely to diminish.   
As the United States continues to adjust to the Fourth Generation War, so must 
our contracting procedures.  This research examines the structure and practice of 
contingency contracting.  The authors use this study to determine if current methods are 
sufficient in the 4GW.   Then, the authors provide recommendations for identified 
problems.     
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The objective of this report is to investigate and analyze past and present 
contingency contracting operations to determine if current practices are sufficient for the 
4GW.  Through research and analysis, the authors will provide information to improve 
contingency contracting operations.  The authors’ research focused on a historical 
analysis of previous contingency operations to identify problems that still exist today.  
Recommendations will be identified that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
contingency contracting operations.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is “How can contingency contracting operations be 
improved in future warfare?”  Secondary questions are: 
1. What problems does history show that hinder effective and efficient 
contingency contracting operations? 
 
2. How do these problems affect contingency contracting? 
 
3. What solutions can be developed to mitigate these problems? 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this project was conducted primarily through literary searches into 
the history of contingency contracting.  Literature was collected from current 
Government Accountability Office reports, after-action reports, lessons learned, DOD 
directives and publications, and other scholarly writings.  Through historical analysis, the 
authors identified significant problem areas that have hindered contingency contracting in 
the past.  Once these problem areas were identified, the authors conducted detailed 
research in the form of policy review and interviews with current and former contingency 
contracting officers to examine each problem’s particular policies and procedures and 
how they affect contingency contracting.  The authors then recommend solutions to those 
problems. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
In writing this thesis, the authors make the following assumptions: 
• The reader has a basic understanding of the contingency contracting 
processes and its associated terminologies.   
• Current operational tempo will remain at current levels or increase. 
• The Fourth Generation War will be the predominant method of warfare in 
the future.  
• The United States will continue to operate in contingent environments 
using contracting as a method in providing combat support and combat 
service support. 





F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This project will guide the reader through a logical sequence of identifying 
problems and solutions to contingency contracting inefficiencies.  Chapter II consists of a 
historical analysis of contingency contracting to identify general problematic trends.  
Chapter III will detail these problem areas and identify how they are negatively affecting 
contingency contracting.  Chapter IV will then make recommendations for these 













































Table 1.   
II. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE 
A. OVERVIEW  
In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out 
that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are 
necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of an Army. 
   Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781 
While the term contingency contracting was coined only a decade or two ago, the 
United States military has been contracting out logistical support for its military forces in 
different degrees in both domestic and overseas operations with varying levels of success 
since 1775.  Early attempts at contracting logistics support for military operations 
sometimes brought the expedition to ruins, but since World War II, contingency 
contracting has generally proved an integral part of the military’s operational capabilities, 
although problems still exist today. 
Table 1 below summarizes the number of contracting personnel, number of 
service members, and the ratio of contracted to military personnel deployed throughout 
American military history.1 
 
Civilians Contracted to Support Military Operations 
War/Conflict Contracted Personnel Military Ratio 
Revolution 1,500 (Est) 9,000 1:6 (Est) 
Mexican/American 6,000 (Est) 33,000 1:6 (Est) 
Civil War 200,000 (Est) 1,000,000 1:5 (Est) 
World War I 85,000 2,000,000 1:20 
World War II 734,000 5,400,000 1:7 
Korea 156,000 393,000 1:2.5 
Vietnam 70,000 359,000 1:6 
Persian Gulf War 5,200 541,000 1:100 
Rwanda/Somalia/Haiti No Records Kept N/A N/A 
Balkans 5,000-20,000 (Varied) 20,000 Up to 1.5:1
 
                                                 
1 Samperelli, S.J. (1990). Contractors on the Battlefield, What Have We Signed Up For? (Research 
Report, Air War College, Air University) pp.6. 
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This chapter analyzes contingency contracting from past, present, and future 
perspectives, beginning with the eighteenth century through the twenty-first century and 
then into future challenges that contingency contracting personnel will encounter.  During 
this analysis, the authors identify existing problems constraining the contracting process 
of deployed forces.  The future of warfare will continue to evolve challenging the United 
States military more than ever to adapt and overcome inherent deficiencies within 
contingency contracting. 
B. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
By 1775, European nations had been contracting logistics support for their armies 
in the field for over 150 years.  For the fledgling United States, the preferred method of 
supplying food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and general labor to its troops in the 
field was the direct purchase method, where Army officers bought directly from civilian 
companies on behalf of the Government.  Greed, a poor transportation system, abuse, and 
bureaucratic red tape rendered the direct purchase system ineffective, which contributed 
to the appalling conditions at Valley Forge such as inadequate winter clothing and 
insufficient provisions.2 
Later, the system of “specific supplies” replaced the direct purchase system.  In 
this system, each state provided specified amounts of goods and services required by the 
military.  This system was almost a complete failure.  Not only were the states slow in 
furnishing supplies, but when they did, it was seldom at the right time or the right place 
where the supplies were needed. It also caused particular problems when troops from one 
state operated in another as one state did not desire to pay for the provisioning of troops 
from outside its own borders. 
In February 1781, it was apparent to both Congress and top military leaders that 
both systems of logistical support were ineffective.  As a result, they appointed Robert 
Morris as Superintendent of Finance of the United States to correct the problem.  Morris 
 




                                                
immediately replaced both failing systems with the European practice of supply by 
private contractors, which he believed would be both more efficient and less costly. 
Almost immediately after instituting private contractors, problems started to arise.  
Army officers complained of the poor quality of rations delivered, accounts for fixed 
military installations and moving army units were being confused, contractors were 
complaining of late payments, and collusion between contractors was rampant.  Both 
George Washington and Alexander Hamilton observed that contractors were often more 
concerned with increasing their profits than with providing the Army with the supplies 
and services it needed when and where they were required.3  Nevertheless, the system of 
private contractors resulted in some improvements in efficiency and cost savings.  By 
1783, this new system was the generally accepted means of supporting the military. 
C. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The War of 1812 saw continued extensive use of private contractors to provide 
logistical support in the form of food, clothing, shelter, and transportation to the 
American Army.  However, this practice was generally unsatisfactory due mainly to the 
lack of supervision by experienced Army logisticians.  As a result, after the war, the 
Army organized the bureaus of Quartermaster, Subsistence, Medical, and Ordnance, and 
staffed them with men of “vigor and vision.”4  This demonstrated a desire by the Army to 
provide a majority of its support organically rather than by contracting it out.  By 1820, 
Secretary of War John Calhoun centralized subsistence procurement almost solely within 
the office of the Commissary General of Subsistence, virtually eliminating the need for 
private contractors. 
By 1846, just prior to the war with Mexico, the military had become very 
effective at supplying its troops from within.  However, the rapid buildup of military 
forces for the war with Mexico strained the military’s procurement system.  Between 
August 1845 and the end of 1846, the Quartermaster’s Department alone placed over 400 
contracts, mostly for transportation services, to support operations in Mexico.  The most 
 
3 Shrader, C.R. (1999). p. 2. 
4 Ibid. p. 3. 
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significant problem the Army faced during this time was discipline and control of 
contractors who accompanied the soldiers in the field.   
The American Civil War once again saw the Union Army scrambling to supply its 
troops in light of another rapid buildup.  Despite the organization of the bureaus of 
Quartermaster, Subsistence, Medical, and Ordnance, the Northern military economy was 
still very much decentralized.  For several months, the various states in the Union 
struggled to outfit new battalions and regiments with uniforms and supplies, sometimes 
competing with each other over limited resources.5  However, by the end of 1861, the 
northern states turned over most of their procurement issues to the respective military 
bureaus.  Most states did this because the Federal Government threatened to stop 
reimbursing state purchases.  In spite of this centralized procurement strategy, and the 
fact that the Quartermaster’s Department employed over 100,000 civilians for production 
and manufacturing of supplies, the Union Army purchased millions of dollars of goods 
and services from the public sector, mostly in the areas of construction, labor, and 
transportation services on or near the battlefield.6 
The Union Army took contingency contracting efforts further by authorizing 
battlefield commanders contracting authority.  Army ordnance regulations allowed “any 
officer, in circumstances of ‘urgent necessity’ to purchase items normally procured by the 
Ordnance Bureau, and to submit a report explaining the necessity to obtain government 
reimbursement.”  However, this authority was revoked due to a limited number of abuse 
cases among a small group of commanders, and the Government’s desire to promote 
competition through a centralized system.7 
D. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The trend towards centralized procurement within the military continued into the 
twentieth century as the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Pay Departments consolidated 
 
5 Wilson, M.R. (2003). The Business of Civil War: Military Enterprise, the State, and Political 
Economy in the United States, 1850-1880.  Enterprise  &Society, Vol. 4, No. 4  p. 601. 
6 Ibid.  p. 602. 
7 Douglas, K.L. (2004). Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Commanders with 
Emergency Change Authority.  The Air Force Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 127. 
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in 1912 into the Quartermaster Corps with approximately 5,400 men.  This consolidation, 
in conjunction with the massive troop buildup at the start of World War I, provided the 
Army a supply of skilled and unskilled men under military control and discipline which 
could be deployed as the Army needed.  As a result, the American Expeditionary Force 
was able to pull from within its own ranks the personnel and skills needed to perform 
almost all aspects of battlefield logistics.  Private contracting was kept to a minimum, 
with extra labor, transportation, and housekeeping services provided by French and 
Belgian firms.8 
The use of contingency contracting during World War II was limited due to the 
nation’s full mobilization of personnel and industry to supply the United States military 
the necessary material and equipment needed to fight a truly global conflict.  As in the 
previous world war, the United States utilized a centralized logistics plan for supporting 
the war effort.  Goods were produced on the home front and then transported to the 
troops in each theater of operations.   
Despite this reliance on organic support, contingency contracting still had its role 
in the war.  World War II introduced two aspects of contingency contracting that are still 
concerns today.  The first was the introduction of the manufacture’s technical 
representative.  The increased complexity of military aircraft, communications 
equipment, vehicles and other war items, and the rapid implementation of newer models 
requiring changes in operating and maintenance procedures made the technical 
representative an essential element at forward airfields, depots, and repair facilities.9  In 
some cases, technical representatives were found on the front lines seeking solutions to 
problems about their firm’s equipment. 
The other facet of contingency contracting exposed during World War II 
concerned contractors engaging the enemy in combat, being killed in combat, or being 
taken prisoner.  The battle of Wake Island was the most vivid example of this.  At the 
commencement of the battle, 1,146 civilian contractors worked on the island along with 
 
8 Shrader, C.R. (1999). p. 6. 
9 Ibid  p. 6. 
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522 soldiers, sailors, and Marines.  As the Japanese began what would turn into a fifteen-
day assault, most of the contractors volunteered to man coastal defense guns, anti-aircraft 
guns, and machine guns while others hauled ammunition and supplies to the various 
fighting positions.  One civilian contractor, Raymond R. Rutledge, was seen throwing 
hand grenades into Japanese landing barges during an early morning landing on 23 
December.10  During breaks in the fighting, the contractors assisted the Marines in 
repairing defensive positions.  At the conclusion of the battle, 70 contractors were killed 
in action and 12 were wounded.  With the exception of about 100 contractors retained by 
the Japanese to help rebuild the island, all the remaining civilians and military personnel 
were transported to Japan where they remained prisoners of war until they were liberated 
in 1945.11 
As the United States unexpectedly entered the Korean War, its rather minimal 
mobilization required a greater need for contractors to provide logistical support.  Most of 
the contracting support came from both Japan and Korea who provided many services 
including stevedoring, road and rail maintenance, and supply-carrying parties.12  
Notwithstanding the large cost of hiring Japanese and Korean workers, the Army 
experienced substantial savings in both money and manpower.  By using Japanese labor 
contractors, the Army reduced its need for service troops by an estimated 250,000, and 
“without Korean workers in Korea, it would doubtless have been necessary for the U.S. 
forces to assign whole divisions of combat troops to supply lines.”13  Despite the above 
savings, not only did the Army lack experienced contracting officers to manage such a 
large program, it also did not have an effective or efficient policy for contracting and 
managing civilians to that scale.  This led to confusion over who was responsible for 
procurement, organization, training, assignment, and administration of contracted labor.14  
 
10 Cressman, R.J. (n.d.). A Magnificent Fight: Marines in the Battle for Wake Island. Retrieved August 
3, 2005, from http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Wake.html. 
11 Cressmen, R.J. (n.d.). 
12 Shrader, C.R. (1999). p. 7. 
13 Houston, J.A. (1989).  Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice, U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War.  
Cranbury, Associated University Press. p. 390. 
14 Shrader, C.R. (1999). p. 8. 
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The Vietnam War saw an explosion in the use of civilian contractors by the 
American military due to the low manpower and industrial mobilization over the eight 
year war and the rapid advances in military technology.  Additionally, President 
Johnson’s decision not to call up the reserves, and Congress’ mandated troop ceilings 
necessitated the use of civilian contractors as force multipliers.  At the height of the war, 
it is estimated that the United States had over 80,000 civilian contractors working in 
Vietnam focusing on construction; base operations; water and ground support; petroleum 
supply; and maintenance and technical support of high-technology systems.  During 
fiscal year 1969, the U.S. Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) spent over 
$234.3 million on service contracts alone.  Even though the use of contractors in Vietnam 
raised the same questions as in previous contingencies about a contractor’s international 
status, control and military discipline, and death by enemy fire, the Joint Logistics 
Review Board in 1970 stated, “U.S. forces committed to conflict have never been better 
supplied than those in Southeast Asia.”15 
E. RECENT CONTINGENCIES: 1990-2005 
From 1975 to 1990, the United States deployed its forces 26 times to various 
overseas contingencies.  Post 1990, the number has sky rocketed to over 70 deployments 
supporting contingencies.16  The following section details some of the more significant 
contingencies since 1990. 
1. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
On August 2, 1990, three Iraqi armored divisions invaded Kuwait.  Within thirty-
six hours, Saddam Hussein’s forces had taken control of the capital, Kuwait City, and had 
pushed to the boarders of Saudi Arabia.  Days later, the 82nd Airborne Division and three 
Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) deployed to defend Saudi Arabia to protect 
America’s vital interests in that region. 
At that time, contingency contracting as we know it today was still maturing.  The 
82nd Airborne’s XVIII Airborne Corps Acquisition Section (CAS) faced many challenges 
 
15 Shrader, C.R. (1999). p. 8. 
16 DoD and Military Department Public Affairs Offices (2001-2002), CDI Military Almanac.   
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as it attempted to procure supplies and services.  The XVIII CAS’s biggest challenge 
came from the Government’s own regulations. 
The initial, and largest, difficulty encountered was the restrictive acquisition 
policies that impeded contingency contracting operations.  The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and 
Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) were not designed for 
contingency operations and their applicability under wartime conditions were vague, 
since they do not contain specific guidance concerning contingency operations. 
Being deployed in a foreign country with different cultures and values only 
complicated matters.  Required pricing proposals were too complicated for many of the 
local vendors.  Full and open competition mandated by the Competition in Contracting 
Act was almost impossible due to the increased urgency of need and the limited sources 
of supply.  Determination of contractor responsibility and fair and reasonable prices was 
entrusted to the contracting officer’s judgement, and was complicated by the lack of 
market knowledge.   
In addition, over reliance on organic logistical support, the lack of emphasis on 
contingency contracting, inadequate contracting organization across the services, and the 
rapid deployment of the troops prevented substantial and meaningful planning and 
training for contingency contracting officers.  Contracting officers deployed without any 
knowledge of Saudi customs, language skills, business practices, or the extra physical 
effort required to operate in the harsh Middle East environment.  Once in country, 
contracting officers had to provide for their own living and transportation arrangements 
while simultaneously receiving and supporting thousands of troops a day with food, 
water, and transportation.17 
As a result of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the Army established the 
contingency contracting officer billet to support its operational commanders beyond their 
organic support capabilities.  Contingency contracting officers were placed at both the 
 
17 Campbell, K.N. (1993). Contingency Contracting Officers: Can They Adequately Support the 
Force?  (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School).  p. 28. 
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division level and the corps level.  The Army also published a supplement to the AFARS 
entitled “Contingency Contracting, Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
Manual No. 2” 
The situation was much the same for the Marines as the XVIII CAS.  For 
example, the Marines utilized the SF-44 (Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher) and DD 1155 
(Order for Supplies or Services) for most of their small purchases.  However, due to the 
limiting and rigid nature of the current acquisition policies and the urgency of need 
demanded during contingency operations, violations to FAR regulations occurred.  
Violations with the SF-44 included payments exceeding funding authorization, payments 
prior to delivery, full payments for incomplete services, and funding amounts written in 
after purchases were made.  Thirty percent of SF-44 purchases before 13 September 1990 
exceeded the threshold amount of $2,500 dollars.18 
Training and organization posed the same problems for the Marines as it did the 
soldiers of the XVIII CAS.  At the time of Desert Shield, only one contingency 
contracting officer billet existed at the 1st FSSG.  While in country, the command 
structure was such that the Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) often had to write up 
a procurement request, purchase the supplies, pay for the supplies, and then sign for 
them.  Interviews after the war indicated that the junior Noncommissioned Officers 
(NCOs) had very poor training,19 nor did they possess any real world experience as most 
of them deployed from base support units.  The senior Staff Noncommissioned Officers 
(SNCOs) were better trained than the junior NCOs, and the officers were reported to have 
the best training in contingency contracting.20 
2. Operation Restore Hope 
In the fall of 1992, famine and civil war had claimed nearly 500,000 Somali lives.  
In the first week of December, the U.N. Security Council approved a multinational 
peacekeeping coalition led by the United States.  On 9 December 1992, the 11th Marine 
 
18 Caldwell, G.R. (1995).  p. 16. 
19 No standardized contingency contracting training existed at that time and the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was not enacted until 1994. 
20 Caldwell, G.R. (1995).  p. 45. 
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Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to Somalia.  
Initial contracting personnel deployed included one Marine Corps Major, one Marine 
Corps Sergeant, an Air Force Captain, and an Air Force Sergeant.   
The first issue of concern for contingency contracting officers was funding.  
Initially, Operation Restore Hope was expected to last no longer than 90 days.  Based on 
this time line, funds allocated towards the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP)21 were limited to $4 million.  One after action report specifically addressed 
this lack of funding: 
For the duration of the event, there was never a clear plan for how long 
U.S. troops would be in Somalia.  Therefore, the contract was funded for 
approximately 90 days of effort at a time.  Funding for the first 60 days 
was provided by the U.S. Marine Corps.  The remainder of the funds came 
from the U.S. Army Forces Command.22 
As operations increased, contracting officers became concerned about creating an 
Anti-Deficiency Act violation by obligating funds that were not yet appropriated.  They 
sometimes had to order contractors to stop work and stand down until more funds became 
available.  As the scope of Operation Restore Hope increased, contract-funding levels 
were subsequently increased to $12 million and then to $18 million.   
The second issue of concern involved the amount of coordination required due to 
the disparate contracting organizational structure throughout the different services. The 
converging of numerous contracting elements from the different services, other NATO 
counties, and LOGCAP, in addition to the extremely limited supplier base in the area, 
required close coordination of contracting efforts to ensure different organizations were 
not competing for the same limited resources.  Lieutenant Colonel Michael Toler, who 
 
21 LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for the use of civilian contractors in 
wartime and other contingencies.  LOGCAP is primarily designed for use in areas where no bilateral or 
multilateral agreements exist. However, LOGCAP may provide additional support in areas with formal 
Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, where other contractors are involved, or where peacetime support 
contracts exist.  Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows the release of military units for other 
missions or to fill support shortfalls. This program provides the Army with additional means to adequately 
support the current and programmed forces.  
22 Robare, W.M. (2000).  Guidance for Army Contingency Contracting Officers in Preparation for 
Military Operations Other Than War. (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). p. 63. 
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led the Department of Defense’s contingency contracting mission in Somalia, recognized 
this dilemma and planned accordingly: 
Each service wanted its own contracting officers under its own command, 
so the idea of a single consolidated joint contracting office in Mogadishu 
was ruled out…To ensure that contracting offices of each service did not 
compete for the same resources, the operations order designated one 
component in each country as the lead, responsible for coordinating all 
purchases in that country.23 
Unfortunately, this necessitated the validation of requirements at a much higher 
level than normal.  It was not unusual for the J-4, the Chief of Staff, or even the Joint 
Task Force Commander to screen and approve individual requirements to ensure 
appropriate contracting activities handled specific requirements in the theater of 
operations.24 
Despite all the lessons learned during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation 
Restore Hope experienced similar problems associated with contracting in a contingency 
environment.  For example, Marines from the 2nd and 3rd FSSG did not deploy with their 
basic necessities like computers, printers, and software, because they anticipated using 
the 1st FSSG’s assets.  Restrictive policies again hampered the acquisition process.  For 
example, Major Michael Corcoran, the Marine Corps contingency contracting officer in 
the region, stated that the requirement to submit a Business Clearance Memorandum25 to 
Headquarters, Marine Corps, 10,000 miles away from the contingency, was a restrictive 
regulation that hindered contracting support.26 
3. Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard 
Operation Joint Endeavor started in December 1995, when NATO deployed a 
joint task force consisting of personnel from fifteen different countries, including 20,000 
 
23 Toler, M.M. (1995) Contingency Contracting: Operation Restore Hope.  Contract Management, 
Vol. 35, No. 1. p. 19. 
24 Robare, W.M. (2000). p. 64. 
25 A Business Clearance Memorandum is a formalized review process of the negotiation and 
solicitation actions leading up to the award of a contract. 
26 McMillon, C.W. (2000). Contingency Contracting Within the Department of Defense: A 
Comparative Analysis.  (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). p17. 
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American soldiers, to end the fighting between Bosnian Croats and Serbs and to enforce 
the Dayton Peace Accords.  After the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, Operation 
Joint Endeavor transitioned to Operation Joint Guard with a new task of keeping the 
peace. 
Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard experienced many of the same 
problems as the previous contingencies.  While initial contingency contracting officers 
were handpicked because they were well-trained and had plenty of contingency 
contracting experience, follow on CCOs had insufficient training and no experience.  
Misunderstandings concerning the scope of the LOGCAP contract prevailed.  Currency 
and exchange rate issues arose as the Bosnian Dinara became worthless.  As a result, 
local vendors demanded payment in German Deustche Marks.  This caused initial 
problems because the FAR requires that contract payments be made in the host nation’s 
currency.  Other problems encountered included lack of administrative tools like standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) and templates of commonly used contracting forms, a high 
frequency of unauthorized commitments, and competition between commands for the 
same scarce resources.27 
4. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
On 19 March 2003, United States and British forces launched a campaign of 
“Shock and Awe” which consisted of cruise missile strikes and attacks from F-117 stealth 
bombers against Saddam Hussein’s regime.  A few hours later, coalition forces crossed 
the boarder and pushed deep into Iraq.  On 9 April 2003, Baghdad was formally secured 
by US forces and Saddam Hussein was officially removed from power.   
Operation Iraqi Freedom has seen the largest use of contingency contracting by 
the Department of Defense in history, particularly with global logistics support contracts 
like LOGCAP and AFCAP28 (LOGCAP was not used in Operation Desert Shield/Desert 
 
27 McMillon, C.W. (2000). p17. 
28 The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) is similar to the Army’s LOGCAP 
program of peacetime planning for the use of civilian contractors in wartime and other contingencies.  
AFCAP is only available for contingent response situations and is designed to provide rapid engineering 
and logistical services.  The intent is to augment the Air Force with civil engineering and services and 
logistics capabilities during worldwide contingency operations, freeing Air Force personnel to perform 
mission essential tasks.  
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Storm).  As of May 2004, spending on LOGCAP in Iraq alone totaled $5.6 billion.  
Recent GAO reports indicate that DOD’s effective use of logistics support contracts 
varied during OIF, particularly in the areas of planning, personnel, and training.   
For example, some organizations, like U.S. Army, Europe, tasked with supporting 
anticipated troop movement through Turkey into Iraq, conducted adequate LOGCAP 
planning and even included the contractor in planning sessions.  U.S. Army, Europe 
reported:  
Contractor planners brought considerable knowledge of contractor 
capabilities, limitations and operations, and their involvement early in the 
planning efforts increased understanding of the requirements an 
capabilities, facilitated communication regarding the statement of work, 
and enhanced mission completion.29 
Conversely, the use of LOGCAP support in Kuwait and Iraq lacked adequate 
planning.  Planning for the use of the LOGCAP contract to support the troops in Iraq did 
not begin until after the fall of Baghdad, was not comprehensive, and did not include the 
contractor.  According to an official from the 101st Airborne Division, there was a lack of 
detailed planning for the use of LOGCAP at the theater and division levels for the 
sustainment phase of the operation.   
The issuance of task orders under these logistics support contracts also lacked 
planning.  Task order 27, which provided support to U.S. troops in Kuwait, was changed 
eighteen times between September 2002 and December 2003, including five changes in 
one month, with some changes taking place on consecutive days.30 
Lack of personnel and poor personnel training contributed to procurement and 
oversight deficiencies as poorly trained contracting officers quickly became 
overwhelmed in their duties due to the expanding scope of the many of the task orders.  
Additionally, military units receiving the contracted services did not fully understand the  
 
 
29 Government Accountability Office. (July, 2004). Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq 
Reconstruction and for Global Logistics Support.  (Report to Congressional Requesters, No. GAO 04-
869T).  Washington, D.C. 
30 Government Accountability Office. (July, 2004). No. GAO 04-869T. 
 18
                                                
part they played in establishing task order requirements or the amount of support the 
contractors required in the form of coordination, requirements generation, contract 
monitoring, and security. 
F. FUTURE CONTINGENCIES 
Fourth Generation War (4GW) 31  Currently, the United States is engaged in a 
Fourth Generation War (4GW) with insurgents in Iraq and element of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.  Whether the task is establishing a contingency contracting office or 
securing key terrain, knowledge of past wars illuminates a dark path in the journey ahead.  
The framework of previous generations of war provides a basic understanding of the 
evolution of war, which may prove useful for effectively dealing with future warfare.32  
Appendix A contains a full description of the first through third generations of war.  
In Fourth Generation War (4GW), no longer is the battlefield linear or “state verse 
state”; instead, the environment is described by one or many different entities fighting 
against a common adversary.  In Iraq, several different entities or insurgents are battling 
United States forces, such as former Baathist party members, al Qaeda members, and 
others that do not want their environment to change.  The complexity of 4GW may 
increase if additional elements of previous generations of war become infused into the 
current environment.33  The first three generations of war sought to defeat an enemy’s 
will with military might however, 4GW seeks to win on the moral, political, and social 
level rather than solely militarily.34  If we want to see what the future of warfare will 
resemble in the coming years, 4GW is the template.  Fourth Generation War is not 
represented by a swift victory, quick redeployment of troops, or a post-war ticker-tape 
 
31 4GW is still a concept and has not been officially recognized as doctrine. 
32 Lind, W.S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J.F., Sutton, J.W., Wilson, G.I. (1989, October). The 
Changing Role of War: Into the Fourth Generation.  Marine Corps Gazette, No. 22-26. p. 26. 
33 Hammes, T.X. (2005).  Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Forth Generation. Strategic 
Forum, No. 214. p. 12. 
34 FMFM 1-A (Draft), (2005). Fourth Generation War; Imperial and Royal Austro- Hungarian 
Marine Corps.  Retrieved October 26, 2005, from http://www.defense-and society.org/vti_bin/shtml.exe/ 
top_level/search_form.htm. 
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parade.  Instead, expect a protracted war entrenched in many years of long, arduous, and 
sporadic fighting.  The engagement of a 4GW opponent can last a decade or more.35   
Contingency contracting personnel will experience continued challenges in a 
4GW not realized in previous generations of war.  Due to the long duration of a 4GW, 
contracting personnel will be required to support the warfighter longer than what current 
doctrine states.  These challenges include a need for increased flexibility in dealing with 
limited host nation support, the ability to respond quickly to rapid requirements, and to 
have a thorough understanding of the security environment and local customs, especially 
when operating in local communities.  Furthermore, knowing how local cultures interact 
with each other will be critical in preventing secular volatility and instability.  
Contingency contracting personnel have the awesome responsibility of not only 
supporting the warfighter, but also balancing the financial support provided to the local 
economy.  
The challenges of maintaining contingency contracting support into 4GW is more 
difficult than previous generations because of the changing face of war and the 
environment in which United States forces operate.  Since the end of the Cold War, U. S. 
forces deployed to locations around the globe commensurate with Third World 
infrastructures.  Some examples include Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  
However, more notably than the frequency is that most locations lacked a workable 
infrastructure, a reliable vendor base, inferior economic and financial capability, and little 
if any experience in dealing with U.S. contractors.  Defense strategist, Thomas P. M. 
Barnett describes these locations in the world as the “Non-integrating Gap.”36,37  States or 
specific populations within a state are not economically connected with the rest of the 
 
35 Hammes, T.X. (2005).  p. 14. 
36 Barnett, T.P.M. (2004). The Pentagon’s New Map. Putnam. p. 127. 
37 Non-Integrating Gap is defined as regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global 
economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the 
Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone 
hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains 
some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just as there are Gap-like pockets throughout the 
Core defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as 
such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances. 
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world.  This aspect of very limited host nation support capability challenges the military 
contingency contracting officer to maintain basic life support for military personnel when 
organic support is not readily available. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter exposed the reader to the concept that the United States military has 
been contracting out logistical support for its deployed forces since 1775, and will 
continue to do so in the future.  The problems experienced in the past are more relevant 
today then ever before.  As long as the military goes to war, contingency contractors will 
be along side the warfighter providing invaluable support. Despite 230 years of 
contingency contracting experience, problems still exist in many areas of this practice. 
Historical analysis has revealed that the main areas contributing to ineffective and 
inefficient contingency contracting are: 
• Restrictive policies that impede contingency contracting operations 
• Insufficient planning for the use of contracting during contingencies 
• Disparate contracting organizational structure throughout the different 
services 
• Insufficient training of contingency contracting personnel 
These deficiencies have limited the force multiplier capability of contingency 
contracting from the Revolutionary War through Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The future 
Fourth Generation War environment will undoubtedly expose these problem areas to a 
greater degree, making the need to change more pressing.  
In these times of force reduction, restricted budgets, and the prospect of more and 
perhaps simultaneous contingency operations, developing a truly effective and efficient 
contingency contracting methodology enables the United States military to respond more 
rapidly, effectively and efficiently, and provide better logistical support to deployed 
forces in any contingency environment whether foreign or domestic. Having the 
necessary knowledge and skills to deal with these unique situations can provide 
contingency contracting personnel with the specific information, skills, and capabilities 




III. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Through historical analysis of previous contingencies and the examination of 
future warfare, Chapter II identified four main shortcomings of contingency contracting 
that hamper its efficiency and effectiveness.  These four areas are: 
• Restrictive policies that impede contingency contracting operations 
• Insufficient planning for the use of contracting during contingencies 
• Disparate contracting organizational structure throughout the different 
services 
• Insufficient training of contingency contracting personnel 
Chapter III focuses on each of the four identified deficiencies and details their 
current practices or procedures, breaking them down by service when necessary.  Then 
this chapter analyzes each area to highlight exactly how it is frustrating efficient 
contingency contracting. 
B. POLICY 
1. Identification of Current Policy 
Federal acquisition laws are designed to deliver the best value product or service 
while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy.  These regulations are 
primarily structured to operate in a peacetime environment where time and urgency of 
need are not a significant factor for the acquisition.  However, contingency environments 
often require the expedited procurement of goods and services to support critical mission 
needs.  Additionally, such environments may lack the infrastructure, supplier base, or 
familiar business practices to allow full compliance with all acquisition regulations.  This 
was evident in past contingencies like Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Restore 
Hope, and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.   
As a result of a contingency’s unique environments, some Federal acquisition 
requirements are relaxed to allow the contracting officer to operate more effectively in a 
contingency environment.  Other regulations can be mitigated if requested by the 
contracting officer and approved by higher contracting authority.  Ultimately, regardless 
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of the contingency environment, the urgency of need, or the relaxed regulations, the 
contracting officer is still expected to comply with the spirit and letter of Federal 
contingency contracting laws and regulations.  This section details the most significant 
statutory deviations to provide relief to the contracting officer in a contingency 
environment, and then identifies other limitations that still exist. 
FAR Part 5: Publicizing Contract Actions: FAR 5.002 Policy requires 
contracting officers to disseminate information on proposed contract actions in order to: 
• Increase competition;  
• Broaden industry participation in meeting Government requirements; and  
• Assist small business concerns, veteran-owned small business concerns, 
service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns, HUBZone small 
business concerns, small disadvantaged business concerns, and women-owned 
small business concerns in obtaining contracts and subcontracts.  
FAR 5.202(a)(2) Exceptions, allows a contracting officer to forgo this requirement 
if: 
The proposed contract action is made under the conditions described in 
6.302-2 (or, for purchases conducted using simplified acquisition 
procedures, if unusual and compelling urgency precludes competition to 
the maximum extent practicable) and the Government would be seriously 
injured if the agency complies with the time periods specified in 5.203; 
made this quote style 
A contracting officer must submit a written justification and approval (J&A) 
letter38 for invoking this exemption.  A written approval is required for this justification 
under the following situations: 
• For a proposed contract not exceeding $500,000, the contracting officer’s 
certification will serve as approval unless a higher approving level is 
established in agency procedures. 
• For a proposed contract over $500,000 but not exceeding $10,000,000, by the 
competition advocate for the procuring activity. 
 
38 A Justification and Approval letter is a mandated request and approval process for utilizing other 
than full and open competition and must cite one of the seven circumstances permitting other than full and 
open competition listed in FAR 6.302.  
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• For a proposed contract over $10,000,000 but not exceeding $50,000,000, by 
the head of the procuring activity, or a designee who is a general or flag 
officer. 
• For a proposed contract over $50,000,000, by the senior procurement 
executive of the agency.39 
A contracting officer may submit a J&A after the contract award if the contracting 
officer believes both these requirements would unreasonably delay the procurement. 
FAR Part 6: Competition Requirements: FAR 6.101 Policy, requires 
contracting officers to promote full and open competition to the maximum extent 
possible:  
• 10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253 require, with certain limited exceptions 
(see Subparts 6.2 and 6.3), that contracting officers shall promote and provide 
for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government 
contracts. 
• Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition through use of 
the competitive procedure(s) contained in this subpart that are best suited to 
the circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfill 
the Government’s requirements efficiently (10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 
253). 
FAR 6.302-2 Unusual and Compelling Urgency, allows a contracting officer to 
forgo this requirement if: 
• When the agency’s need for the supplies or services is of such an unusual and 
compelling urgency that the Government would be seriously injured unless 
the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits 
bids or proposals, full and open competition need not be provided for. 
This authority applies in those situations where: 
• An unusual and compelling urgency precludes full and open competition; and  
• Delay in award of a contract would result in serious injury, financial or other, 
to the Government. 
A contracting officer must submit a written J&A for invoking this exemption.  A 
contracting officer may submit a J&A after the contract award if the contracting officer 
believes both these requirements would unreasonably delay the procurement.  
 
39 Robare, W. (2000). p. 51. 
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Additionally, contracting officers shall request offers from as many potential sources as is 
practicable under the circumstances. 
FAR Part 13: Simplified Acquisitions:  FAR 13.003 Policy, requires contracting 
officer to use simplified acquisitions to the maximum extent possible. 
• Agencies shall use simplified acquisition procedures to the maximum extent 
practicable for all purchases of supplies or services not exceeding the 
simplified acquisition threshold (including purchases at or below the micro-
purchase threshold). 
FAR 2.101 Definitions, raises the simplified acquisition threshold to a higher level 
for contingency operations. 
• $100,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or services that, as determined 
by the head of the agency, are to be used to support a contingency operation or 
to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical, or 
radiological attack (41 U.S.C. 428a), the term means— 
• $250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or 
purchase to be made, inside the United States; and 
 
• $1 million for any contract to be awarded and performed, or 
purchase to be made, outside the United States. 
FAR 13.500(e)(1) establishes the simplified acquisition threshold for commercial 
items at $10 million.  This threshold is part of an experimental program that expires on 1 
January 2006.  No written J&A letter is required to invoke these policies. 
FAR 13.106-1(c)(1) Soliciting Orally, authorizes contracting officers to utilize 
oral solicitations, vice written or other time-consuming methods, during contingency 
operations.  The contracting officer shall solicit quotations orally to the maximum extent 
practicable, if— 
• The acquisition does not exceed the simplified acquisition threshold; 
• Oral solicitation is more efficient than soliciting through available electronic 
commerce alternatives; and 
• Notice is not required under FAR 5.101. 
FAR 15.203(f) also authorizes a contracting officer to utilize an oral request for 
proposals during a contingency environment if normal solicitation would delay the 
acquisition of supplies or services to the detriment of the Government and a notice is not 
required under FAR 5.202 (e.g., perishable items and support of contingency operations 
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or other emergency situations). Use of an oral request for proposal (RFP) does not relieve 
the contracting officer from complying with other FAR requirements. 
FAR 33 Protests, Disputes, and Appeals: FAR 33.103 Protests to the Agency 
and FAR 33.104 Protests to GAO.  Frequently, a contractor will file a protest either to the 
contracting agency or directly to the GAO.  A protest can be filed either before or after 
contract award.  Upon receipt of a protest before award, a contracting officer is not 
authorized to award the contract until protest has been resolved.  If a protest is received 
within 10 days of a contract award, the contracting officer must suspend performance 
until the protest is settled.  These requirements to either not award a contract or to 
suspend performance are waived for urgent and compelling reasons or if it is determined 
to be in the best interest of the Government to do so.  In either case, written justification 
or statement of determination must be drafted.  Such justification or determination shall 
be approved at a level above the contracting officer, or by another official pursuant to 
agency procedures. 
DFARS 217.74 Undefinitized Contract Actions: Undefinitized contract action 
means any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not 
agreed upon before performance is begun under the action. Examples are letter contracts, 
orders under basic ordering agreements, and provisioned item orders, for which the price 
has not been agreed upon before performance has begun.  A contracting officer is 
generally not allowed to enter into an undefinitized contract.   
DFARS 217.7403 Policy, states exceptions to utilizing undefinitized contract 
actions will be as complete and definite as practicable under the particular circumstances 
and used only when  
• The negotiation of a definitive contract action is not possible in sufficient time 
to meet the Government's requirements; and 
• The Government's interest demands that the contractor be given a binding 
commitment so that contract performance can begin immediately. 
A contracting officer must request written approval from the head of contracting 
activity to utilize undefinitized contract actions.  The contracting officer’s request must  
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fully explain the need to begin performance before terms and conditions are definitized, 
including the adverse impact on agency requirements resulting from delays in beginning 
performance.   
As with any contracting activity, the contracting officer must not enter into an 
anti-deficiency act violation.  For undefinitized contract actions, the contracting officer 
shall not obligate more than 50 percent of the not-to-exceed price before definitization.  
However, DFARS 217.7404-5 Exceptions, allows this limitation to be waived by the head 
of contracting agency if it is necessary to support 
• A contingency operation as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13); or 
• A humanitarian or peacekeeping operation as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2302(7). 
DFARS 213.301 Governmentwide Commercial Purchase Card: The 
Governmentwide commercial purchase card is a credit card used as the primary method 
of purchase and/or method of payment for purchases valued at or below the micro-
purchase threshold of $2,500.  An appropriately trained and appointed individual may use 
the Governmentwide commercial purchase card to make a purchase that exceeds the 
micro-purchase threshold but does not exceed $25,000, if the purchase: 
• Is made outside the United States for use outside the United States; and 
• Is for a commercial item; but 
• Is not for work to be performed by employees recruited within the United 
States; 
• Is not for supplies or services originating from, or transported from or 
through, sources identified in FAR Subpart 25.7; 
• Is not for ball or roller bearings as end items;  
• Does not require access to classified or Privacy Act information; and 
• Does not require transportation of supplies by sea; and 
Additionally, the individual making the purchase  
• Is authorized and trained in accordance with agency procedures; 
• Complies with the requirements of FAR 8.002 in making the purchase; and 
• Seeks maximum practicable competition for the purchase in accordance with 
FAR 13.104(b) 
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DFARS 213.301(3) allows a contracting officer supporting a contingency or a 
humanitarian or peacekeeping operation to use the Governmentwide commercial 
purchase card to make a purchase that exceeds the micro-purchase threshold but does not 
exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, if 
• The supplies or services being purchased are immediately available; 
• One delivery and one payment will be made; and 
• All other above requirements are met 
DFARS 213.306 SF 44, Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher: The SF 44 is 
primarily used for over-the-counter purchases when away from the purchasing office or 
at isolated activities.  The SF 44 acts as the contract, the invoice, the payment voucher, 
and the receiving report.  The micro-purchase limit applies to all purchases utilizing the 
SF 44 except for overseas transactions by contracting officers in support of a contingency 
operation or a humanitarian or peacekeeping operation.  During such contingencies, the 
dollar threshold is the same as the simplified acquisition threshold. 
2. Analysis of Current Policy 
The above policy exceptions are a step in the right direction and greatly assist the 
contingency contracting officer.  However, inefficiencies in policy still exist.  Interviews 
with current and former CCOs identified two main policy issues that hinder a CCO.   
The first issue is the requirement to submit a justification and authorization letter.  
Before a CCO can be authorized to operate under the exceptions listed in FAR 
5.202(a)(2), FAR 6.302-2, FAR 33.103, and DFARS 217.7403, the CCO must submit a 
justification letter for each contract and wait for authorization. (The approving authority 
can issue a class waiver that applies to multiple actions meeting pre-established criteria, 
however, approving authorities rarely issue these waivers.)  While in two of these four 
cases the CCO can submit the letter after the procurement action has taken place, this 
requirement places an administrative burden on the CCO, causing him to expend time 
that could be used to procure new requirements or to monitor contactor progress on 
current contracts. 
The second issue is the dollar thresholds that act as a system of checks and 
balances to monitor spending.  Current thresholds are too restrictive in today’s economy.  
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As one CCO stated, “Thresholds are very important, but may be too strict for the 
contingency environment.  Granted, we can’t have free reins out there, but we need to be 
able to do our jobs with minimal issues.”40  When a contract price reaches a dollar 
threshold, additional administrative requirements must be initiated to continue that 
procurement action.  This creates extra administrative burdens on the CCO that 
introduces inefficiencies into the procurement process. 
The third issue that hinders a CCOs effectiveness, particularly in a joint 
environment, involves service- specific policy regulations.  For example, a Marine CCO 
must submit a Business Clearance to Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) for all 
contracts over $1 million.  For a contract between $100,000 and $1 million, the CCO 
must still submit the Business Clearance, but he can authorize it himself.41  (This 
requirement was previously identified as an inefficiency in 1992 during Operation 
Restore Hope.)  Coupled with the fact that currently in OIF, Air Force contracting 
personnel are augmenting Marine CCOs, service specific policies would limit the 
effectiveness of contingency contracting. 
C. PLANNING 
This section discusses military planning.  Specifically, the authors address the 
planning actions included in both the Service and Joint arenas.  Discussions include 
descriptions of the three levels of planning, strategic, operational and tactical, the two 
types of planning, Crisis Action and Deliberate, as well as the phases involved with each 
planning type.  Descriptions of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint 
Operation Planning Execution System (JOPES) are also included.   
Most importantly, the discussion emphasizes the importance of establishing and 
including the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) within all levels of the 
planning framework.  Integrating contingency contracting planning early in the planning 
process will improve the support that all troops receive during the contingency operation.  
Figure 1 below displays the various players in the planning process.  
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Figure 1.   Players in the Planning Process 
Source: Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 
 
1. The Planning Process 
Planning at the Strategic Level: The National Command Authority conducts 
strategic planning for joint operations.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, certain supporting 
executive-level agencies, and a group collectively called the Joint Planning and 
Execution Community (JPEC) are also involved.42  A strategic plan is significant because 
it helps to achieve the effective use of scarce logistical resources.  The Joint Strategic 
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) accomplishes this “by providing strategic guidance, including 
the apportionment of resources (for planning purposes) to the Combatant Commanders 
(COCOM) and the Chiefs of Services, to accomplish assigned planning tasks, based on 
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42 Government Printing Office. (1995). Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operations Planning and 
Execution System, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C., pp. GL-12. 
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Table 2.   
current military capabilities for the next 18 to 24 months.”43  Table 2 displays the seven 
functions that the JSCP provides to the COCOMs.  
 
JSCP Functions Provided to the COCOMS 
Source: Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. 
1) A summary of the current national military strategy for 
deterrence and war, general strategic taskings and to the 
COCOMs, and the strategic direction required to coordinate 
the efforts of the COCOMs in the attainment of national 
military objectives 
2) Planning guidance to the COCOMs governing the 
development of plans and security assistance 
recommendations to support the national military strategy 
3) Planning guidance to the Services and Defense agencies for 
supporting the COCOMs in the execution of assigned 
objectives and tasks 
4) Strategic taskings to the COCOMs specifying, where 
appropriate, the plans required for contingencies 
5) A listing of major combat forces expected to be available 
during the plan’s effective period under various conditions of 
mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the 
COCOMs for planning 
6) Service and force unique information and limitations on the 
use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings 
7) An intelligence estimate for planning 
 
The strategic plan specifically identifies processes and establishes key 
responsibilities at the COCOM level.  This plan must clearly designate the 
responsibilities and tasking of the participating forces.44  Ideally, strategic planning must 
include experienced and credentialed contingency contracting personnel.45 
A strategic plan should have three basic characteristics: simplicity, flexibility and 
credibility.  The plan should identify the various key operational areas and who will be 
                                                 
43 Government Printing Office. (1995). Joint Publication 5-03.1, p. III-6. 
44 Kirstein, J.A. (2003) A Study of the Efficacy of Unit Contingency Contracting Training (Thesis, Air 
Force Institute of Technology) p.16. 
45 Experienced and credentialed refers to Contracting Officers who have been trained, educated, 
(possess experience from a Joint environment) and have developed the skills required to succeed as a 
Contracting Officer.   
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Table 3.   
responsible for them.  The strategic plan should establish the over-arching mission 
requirements.  Any strategic plan should include provisions for continuous review of the 
entire planning process.  Additional areas that a strategic plan must encompass include:46 
• Identification of required resources and availability of these resources 
specifically: personnel, materials, technology, and offices  
• Identification of tasking that can be carried out by contractors or external 
assistance 
• Identification of other agencies and organizations which have a statutory role 
in the process and setting up effective coordination 
Deliberate Action Planning (DAP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) are the two 
primary types of strategic planning.  The difference between these two types of planning 
is based on, among other things, the amount of time available.  DAPs are methodically 
developed and revised without time constraints.  They involve the complete participation 
of the commanders and staffs of the JPEC.  This type of plan anticipates a contingency 
and is developed accordingly.  The DAP is man-hour intensive and can take up to twelve 
months to be fully developed.  Table 3 identifies the five phases associated with a 
deliberate action plan and the tasking involved in each phase.   
 
Deliberate Action Planning Phases 
Source: Joint Publication 5-03.1, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. 
Phase 1 – Initiation  COCOM receives planning task and 
guidance from Major forces and strategic 
lifts assets available planning are 
apportioned   
Phase 2 – Concept Development Mission statement is deduced      
Subordinate tasks are derived       
Alternative courses of action are analyzed   
Concept of operations is developed       
The product: COCOM’s Strategic Concept
Phase 3 – Plan Development 
 
 
Forces are selected and time phased    
Support requirements are computed     
Strategic deployment is simulated     
Shortfalls are identified and resolved    
Operation Plan is documented               
                                                 
46 Bethany, D.A. and Miller, M.A. (1990). Development of the Air Force Contingency Contracting 
Course Framework (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology) p.16. 
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The product:  A completed plan 
Phase 4 – Plan Review Operation Plan is reviewed and approved  
COCOM revises plan IAW review 
comments The product: An approved plan 
Phase – 5 Supporting Plans Supporting plans are completed, 
documented and validated                     
The product:  A family of plans                    
 
Crisis action planning (CAP) requires immediate action in just a few hours or 
days.  This type of plan also demands flexibility.  Crisis action planning procedures 
promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of executable courses 
of action and communication reports along with recommendations from the COCOM to 
the National Command Authorities.  Table 4 details the phases of Crisis Action Planning. 
 
Table 4.   Crisis Action Planning Phases 
Source: Joint Publication 5-03.1 Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. 
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Essential elements of a DAP can and often are used to formulate the basic 
structure of a CAP.  By using the DAP as a template, a CCO can quickly develop a CAP.  
Table 5 compares these two primary planning tools.  As previously discussed, the 
primary difference between the two types is the time available to plan.  Other significant 
differences include the amount of phases in each plan, the level of JPEC involvement and 
the final products of each plan.   
 
Table 5.   Comparison of Crisis Action Planning and Deliberate Planning 
Source: Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. 
 Crisis Action Planning Deliberate Planning 
Time Available to Plan Hours or days 18-24 Months 
JPEC Involvement For security reasons, 
possibly very limited using 
close-hold procedures 
Full participation 
Phases 6 Phases from Situation 
Development to Execution 
5 Phases from Initiation to 
Supporting Plans 
Document Assigning Tasks WARNING ORDER to 
COCOM; COCOM assigns 
tasks with EVALUATION 
REQUEST message 
JSCP to COCOM: COCOM 
assigns tasks with planning 
or other written directive 
Forces for Planning ALLOCATED in the 
WARNING, PLANNING, 
ALERT, or EXECUTE 
ORDER 
APPORTIONED in JSCP 
Early Planning Guidance to WARNING ORDER from 
CJCS; COCOM’s  
EVALUATION REQUEST 
Planning Directive issued 
by COCOM after planning 
guidance step of concept 
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Staff development phase 
Commander’s Estimate Communicates 
recommendations of 
COCOM to the 
CHCS/NCA 
Communicates the 
COCOM’s DECISION to 
staff and subordinate 
commanders 
Decision on COA NCA decide COA COCOM decides COA with 
review by CJCS 
Execution Document EXECUTE ORDER When an operation plan is 
implemented, it is converted 
to an OPORD, and executed 
with an EXECUTE 
ORDER 
Products Campaign plan (if required) 
with supporting OPORDs  
OPLAN or CONPLAN 
with supporting plans 
 
The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is a combination of 
joint policies and procedures, supported by automated data processing (ADP), designed 
to provide joint commanders and planners with a capability to plan and conduct joint 
military operations.  JOPES supports senior-level decision-makers and their staffs at the 
National Command Authority (NCA) level and throughout the JPEC.  Combatant 
commanders use JOPES to determine the best course of action (COA) to accomplish 
assigned tasks and direct the actions necessary to accomplish the mission.  This system is 
designed to encompass both Deliberate Action Planning and Crisis Action Planning and 
to reduce the time required to accomplish either planning process.  
Planning at the Operational Level: Operational plans link strategic objectives to 
the tactical employment of forces.  The operational plan determines when, where, and for 
what purpose forces are employed.  This plan governs the deployment of these forces, 
their commitment to battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to 
achieve operational and strategic objectives. 
Like the strategic plan, the operational plan (OPLAN) should be specific, easily 
understood, and define required activities for all commanders and staff members.  
Operational plans are time sensitive and are more complex than the strategic plan due 
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primarily to the additional details required to execute them.  Operational plans can be 
developed much like strategic plans using both crisis action and deliberate action 
planning, based upon imposed time constraints.   
Planning at the Tactical Level: The main objective at this level is the planning 
and development of specific tasking.  This planning establishes specific criteria that may 
occur and changes that may require additional planning prior to the execution of the 
mission.47  Tactical planning employs units in combat.  It includes the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to 
use their full potential.  Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles. 
Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP):  The CCSP is a planning 
document written in standard order format which delineates contracting command and 
control.  It also establishes the location and structure of the contracting office, sub-
offices, and gives detailed instruction for contracting support during the contingency.  
The CCSP ensures contracting support plans and procedures are aligned with the 
Operational Logistics Plan (OPLAN) through the Logistics Plan (LOGPLAN) annex.  
Although the CCSP is an appendix to the LOGPLAN annex, the use of this tool can act 
as a force multiplier.  A CCSP dictates contracting plans and procedures are carried out to 
support deployed forces.  If properly executed, the CCSP can result in greater efficiencies 
and effectiveness in supporting operations. 
The military continues to increase the amount of contracting actions conducted 
and dollar amounts spent on contingency operations.  These increased efforts reiterate the 
CCSP requirement and demonstrate its importance and significance in the planning 
process.  The CCSP covers the types of support to be provided and it should discuss how 
the support is provided.  This plan also provides customers the details of the support and 
how it is provided.  Table 6 lists the contents of a generic contingency contracting 
support plan.  This listing is not all-inclusive but contains the minimum basic elements 
that must be addressed in a Contingency Contracting Support Plan.  A well-developed 
CCSP will be tailored to the specific environment of the contingency. 
 
47 “Management in the 21st Century.”  Accessed September 12, 2005 from http://itech.fgcu.edu. 
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Table 6.   Generic CCSP 
Source: DAU CON 234, Contingency Contracting Student Handbook 
1. Establish contracting-specific command and control relationships 
2. Establish the location/structure of the contracting office/sub-offices (to 
include which units will be supported by each activity) 
3. Establish procedures for appointing, training, and employing Ordering 
Officers (OO), Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR), Disbursing 
Agents, and Government Contracting Purchase Card (GCPC) holders 
4. Establish requirements for manpower, equipment and supplies required for 
contracting support and the deployment sequence 
5. Establish types of supplies, services, and construction customers can 
expect to receive through contingency contracting as well a list of any 
special prioritization or control measures for scarce commodities or 
services 
6. Establish procedures for defining, validating, processing and satisfying 
customer requirements 
7. Establish procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors 
8. Establish procedures for closing out contracting operations and 
redeployment 
9. Establish security requirements and procedures for contracting and 
contractor personnel 
10. Establish specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions that apply 
to the supported operation 
11. Emphasize the concept of contracting operations that are phased and 
synchronized with a supported plan 
12. Document descriptions and assessments of Host Nation agreements, 
customs, laws, culture, language, religion, and business practices which 
may impact contracting operations 
13. Document potential environmental impacts of the operation (e.g., the 
U.S.’s or host nation’s environmental laws incorporated into the contracts 
or whichever is more stringent) 
 
2.   Analysis of the Planning Process 
The United States continues to conduct contingency operations across the globe.  
Historical analysis from Chapter II has revealed there are several reasons why 
contingency contracting planning efforts are inadequate.  First, planners at the strategic 
level do not identify key contingency contracting events in the planning process.  Second, 
there is a lack of experienced and credentialed personnel in the upper levels of 
contingency contract planning.  In addition, it is apparent that lessons learned from past 
contingencies are not being applied to current contingencies.  Failure to include the CCO 
in the planning process prevents him or her from fully understanding the concept of 
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operations, which precludes the CCO from developing an effective contracting plan to 
support the mission of the COCOM.  This lack of planning results in inefficient 
contracting operations manifested in poor logistical support, extra administrative burdens, 
potential funding issues, and loss of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Within the JPEC arena, the CCO is responsible for providing contracting 
guidance and policy for the contingent theater.  This planning enables organizational 
CCOs to fill the void between organic support and operational requirements.  Strategic 
planning for contingency contracting was neglected in past operations.  Senior 
commanders may understand the importance of logistics to support an operation, but 
often neglect to identify contracting as a means of supporting the logistics needs in the 
planning process.  A review of the logistical annex of the OPLAN for OIF revealed that 
contracting efforts were not integrated into the planning process.48   This lack of 
integration caused delivery delays for services and supplies that degraded mission 
support.  Surprisingly, planning for the support of the troops in Iraq did not begin until 
after the fall of Bagdad.  This planning was not comprehensive and did not include the 
contractor.49   
Contingency Contracting Support Plan: In previous contingency operations, 
areas of the CCSP were overlooked because CCOs were not included in the original 
planning cells.50  To ensure the success of an OPLAN, a CCO must be included in the 
preparation, writing and review of that plan.  The goal of this planning is to ensure 
harmony between the CCSP, LOGPLAN, and OPLAN and to avoid disconnects between 
the CCSP, LOGPLAN and OPLAN.  Table 6 lists specific topics that should be 
addressed by the CCO when developing a CCSP.51   
 
48 Anderson, M.S. and Flaherty, G. P. (2003), Analysis of the Contingency Contracting Support Plan 
within the Joint Planning Process Framework (Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology) p.1. 
49 Government Accountability Office. (2004).  No. GAO 04-869T. 
50 Anderson, M.S. and Flaherty, G. P. (2003). p.1. 
51 Defense Acquisition University. (2000). Contingency Contracting Student Handbook, (CON234). p. 
7-17,18.  
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By properly addressing the topics listed in Table 6, while integrating the CCSP 
with the LOGPLAN and OPLAN, the prudent CCO develops contracting actions which 
best support the requirements of the COCOM.  The CCO must also understand the 
expectations of increased activity and plan for the potential of increased requirements.  
An alignment failure in the planning process between the CCSP and the OPLAN will 
diminish the effectiveness of contingency contracting. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
1. Contracting Organizations within the Services 
The first part of this section is an independent identification of each service’s 
contracting organization, which is appropriate because of the unique missions that each 
service performs.  The second part contains a consolidated analysis of the services to 
identify the problems that exist.     
United States Army (USA): The Army is currently changing the way contracting 
officers and contracting agents organize for contingency operations.  The contracting 
officer's positions were previously embedded at the maneuver brigade combat teams 
(BCT), divisions, and the higher echelons.  They served within these units and deployed 
as a part of the organization.  Now, contracting officer and agent positions are moving 
towards a structure that allows for more flexibility and greater command and control. 
Currently, the Army is in the process of standing up the newly formed Army Field 
Support Brigades (AFSB).  Figure 2 depicts the Army’s Contingency Contracting 
Battalion.  The formation of the AFSB evolved out of the joining of acquisition, logistics, 
and technologies (ALT) capabilities and the growing need to support current operational 
tempo.  There are eight regionally aligned AFSBs, which are designed to support the 
Combatant Commands (COCOM) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) units.   
A contingency contracting (CC) battalion is attached to the AFSB.  The CC 
Battalion consists of contracting teams and provides support to the operational and 
tactical area of operations.  The primary location contracting teams operate from will be 
in accordance with the Contracting Support Plan (CSP).  This location may or may not be  
 
 
in the same location as the supported unit or with the vendor base.  It is possible for the 
contracting team to be co-located with the supported unit and vendor base, but this is the 
commander’s decision.52      
 
Army Field Support  
Brigade  
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Logistics & Acquisition & Contracting 
Sustainment Technology Support 
Contingency 
Contracting Bn   
Figure 2.   Army Contingency Contracting Battalion 
Source: FMI 4-93 41, Army Field Support Brigade.  
 
United States Navy (USN): The Navy Supply Corps is the source for Navy 
Contingency Contracting Officers.  The Navy recently revised its Navy Supplies and 
Services Contingency Contracting Program to better support worldwide crisis situations. 
NAVSUPINST 4230.37C promulgates guidance and procedures for maintaining a viable 
contingency contracting program.  
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Contracting Management 
Directorate leads the Navy’s contracting community and provides contracting services 
across the Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS).  NAVSUP (Deputy Commander for 
Contracting Management) serves as the executive agent (EA) for the Navy's Contingency 
Contracting Officer (CCO) Program, Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA), and is the 
program manager for Navy Supplies and Services Contingency Contracting Programs.53   
The Navy Supplies and Services Contingency Contracting Program was chartered 
to provide logistics support to the fleet and multinational forces in support of a 
contingency.  However, it does not send personnel to support military exercises and it 
does not fill routine staff vacancies. Active duty officers individually augment from 
 
52 Department of the Army (2005), FMI 4-93 41, Army Field Support Brigade, pp. 7-3. 
53 Naval Supply Systems Command. Retrieved  October 20, 2005, from 
http://www.navsup.navy.mil/portal/page?_pageid=477,261985,477_262048&_dad=p5star&_schema=P5ST
AR . 
current billets to fill contingency contracting positions.  Active duty officers must consist 
of 50% of the assigned quotas.  Reservists and civil service personnel are tasked to fill 
the remaining requirements.   Figure 3 lists the primary commands that provide Navy 
Contingency Contracting personnel.  Officers filling these billets must possess a supply 
subspecialty code and/or a DAWIA certification in contracting.   
 
 Department of  
the Navy 
 
 Navy Supply Corps 
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NAVAIR NAVSUP NAVSEA 
 NAVICP COMFISCS 
 
Figure 3.   Navy Sources for Contingency Contracting Officers 
Source: NAVSUPINST 4230.37C, Navy Supplies and Services Contingency Contracting Program. 
 
 
 United States Air Force (USAF): The operational wing organization is the 
primary war-fighting instrument for the Air Force and contains four groups: operational, 
logistics, support, and medical.  The logistics group contains the contracting squadron, 
which is a primary source of contingency contracting personnel for the Air Force. The 
wing has 1,000-5,000 personnel and has a distinct mission with a specified scope.  Figure 







54 Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization, 21 April 2004, p.18.  Retrieved November 2, 
2005, from http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/38/afi38-101/afi38-101.pdf. 
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Figure 4.   Air Force Operational Wing Structure 
Source: Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization 
  
 The logistics group can be tactical or administrative and dependent or 
independent.  A dependent group is a mission, logistics, support, medical, or a large 
functional unit.  An independent group’s structure is comprised from the same elements 
of a like-type wing, but on a smaller scale not worthy of a wing designation.  The group 
has approximately 500-2,000 personnel and two or more subordinate squadrons.   Figure 










Logistics Support Maintenance Contracting Supply  Transportation 
Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron Squadron 
Figure 5.   Air Force Logistics Group Structure              
Source: Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization 
 
Air Force contracting squadrons typically fall under a logistics group and have 
four subordinate contracting and analysis flights.  Contracting organizational structure 
exists within contracting squadrons, operational contracting offices, and contracting 
divisions. The squadron is the basic operational unit in the Air Force and is lead by 
squadron commanders, office chiefs, or directors.  Their subordinate elements can be 
 
55 Air Force Instruction pp. 38-101. 
contracting flights, contracting branches, or another locally determined organizational 
component.  Figure 6 is a typical contracting squadron organizational chart. 56, 57       











Construction  Management Commodities  Services 
Contracting  Analysis & Contracting  Contracting 
Flight Support Flight Flight Flight 
Figure 6.   Air Force Contracting Squadron Structure                      
Source: Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization 
 
United States Marine Corps (USMC): The Marine Corps has revealed a new 
approach to organizing contracting personnel within the services’ acquisition 
community.58  The present organizational structure of the Marine Corps places 
contingency contracting billets within a Regional Contracting Office (RCO), a Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), and a Marine Logistics Group (MLG), formally known as 
Force Service Support Group (FSSG).  Currently, there are approximately twenty 
Marines serving in 9656 (officer) and 3044 (enlisted) billets in any one of the three 
Marine Expeditionary Forces: I MEF (Camp Pendleton, CA), II MEF (Camp Lejeune, 
NC), or III MEF (Okinawa, Japan).  The present force structure in Table 7 shows a 






56 Air Force Instruction 64-102, Operational Contracting Program. Retrieved November 2, 2005, 
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/64/afi64-102/afi64-102.pdf.  
57 Air Force Instruction pp. 38-101. 
58 MARADMIN 420/05, Reorganization and Training of MOS’s 9656 and 3044 Contracting 
Personnel.  Retrieved October 24, 2005, from 
http://www.usmc.mil/maradmins/maradmin2000.nsf/maradmins. 
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Table 7.   
Table 8.   
                                                
Present Marine Corps Contracting Structure 
           
Present Contracting Structure 
          RCO  MEF  MLG  Totals 
 
 O4s   1       1              2 
 O3s   1            1           2 
 Enl     9      2        9         *20 
 
* Not all enlisted Marines are deployable due to training requirements  
   
Source: Installation and Logistics, Contracts Division, Sep 2005  
 
The current operational environment for Marine Corps personnel has encouraged 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) to propose changes of the present contracting 
structure to better support the warfighter.  Table 8 shows the proposed structure of a MEF 
contracting organization.  
  
Proposed Marine Corps Contracting Structure 
           
       Proposed Contracting Structure 
                  MEF  RCO  Totals 
 
  O5s    1    1     2 
  O4s    2            2 
  O3s    4             4       
  Enl      1    29  *30 
 
* Not all enlisted Marines are deployable due to training requirements 
                     
Source: Installation and Logistics, Contracts Division, Sep 2005
 
The proposed structure assigns personnel to either the MEF staff or their 
respective RCO when not deployed.  Assignment to the RCO ensures contracting 
personnel are maintaining their skill proficiency and certifications required by DAWIA.59   
 
 
59 MARADMIN 420/05. 
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2. Analysis of Services Contracting Organization 
Identification of the services contingency contracting organizational structures 
revealed many differences because each service has different missions and accomplishing 
those missions requires unique structures.  More notably, these differences allow each 
service to support a war of long duration not experienced since the Vietnam War.  The 
relatively short contingencies since Vietnam never tested these organizational structures 
and placed low priority on contracting support.  Today, 4GW requires organizational 
changes necessary to accommodate a war of long duration and a military that places a 
higher priority on using contingency contracting as “supporting arms” in the successful 
prosecution of war.  The authors contend the organizational challenges of supporting a 
protracted contingency may fall short due to the unpredictable and dynamic nature of 
4GW.   
The GWOT has brought organizational changes to the execution of contingency 
contracting between the services or in a truly joint environment that may potentially 
improve future support.  One of the most intriguing observations is the integration of 
contingency contracting personnel between the services at the tactical level, which is 
common at the strategic and operational levels, but not very common at the tactical level.  
For example, the Marine Corps used Air Force contingency contracting personnel to 
augment their organization for carrying out contracting functions during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.60  If there has ever been a separation of cultures between the services, it would 
be between the Air Force and the Marines.  Yet when it comes to performing contracting, 
it has been shown that service members can effectively execute their duties from within 
as well as from another services command.  Is having a Joint contingency contracting 
command for coordinating the execution of strategic, operational, and tactical 
contingency contracting valid?  Although this question posses great discussions and 
additional research, the authors feel it is better left for study in its entirety and not as a 
subset of this project.  
 
 
60 Ingle, J., (2005). U.S. Air Force 1st Lt. Ed Ruckwardt, Contracting officer experiences frontline action 




This section focuses on contingency contracting training for Fourth Generation 
War (4GW) environment.  The authors looked at the history of United States 
deployments and noticed an alarming statistic that plays heavily into the training aspect 
of contingency contracting personnel.  From 1975 to 1990, the United States deployed its 
forces twenty six times to various overseas contingencies.  Post 1990, the number has sky 
rocketed to over seventy deployments supporting contingencies.  A majority of these 
deployments indicate a need to have qualified contingency contractors ready to deploy on 
short notice.  The authors’ research has discovered a training and education system that is 
in need of overhaul. This research identified several deficiencies in contingency 
contracting education and training to include:  
• No DAWIA certification  
• Lack of a developed curriculum 
• CON 234 prerequisites restrict student enrollment 
• Failure to integrate lessons learned  
The authors will discuss these specific areas in this section.  Although the authors 
feel more problems have yet to be identified, correcting these deficiencies first will 
initiate the corrective process at the source, so that the in–flow of new contingency 
contracting personnel to overseas contingencies will have the necessary knowledge and 
training to successfully employ contracting services when called upon.  
1. Identification of Current Training: 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act: In response to continuing 
concerns about the Department of Defense's ability to effectively manage its acquisition 
programs, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Action 
(DAWIA) on November 5, 1990.  This act required the Secretary of Defense to establish 
an acquisition workforce with specific experience, education, and training qualifications.  






                                                
management structure, policies and regulations for implementing the act's provisions, (2) 
establish qualification requirements, and (3) provide training and education to meet these 
requirements. 61 
Each acquisition position throughout DOD is now required to have a designated 
certification standard.  Certification is the process by which the DOD agencies determine 
whether an individual meets all the mandatory standards as they relate to education, 
experience and training.  There are three established career levels within each career 
field.  The levels listed below identify the career levels as they relate to military 
acquisition officer positions. 
(1) Level I (Basic Level) - This level is for individuals in the grades of O-1 
through O-3.  Basic level training standards are designed to establish fundamental 
qualifications and expertise in the individual's job series, functional area, or career field.  
Development at the basic level lays the foundation for career progression and is designed 
to prepare qualified, motivated personnel for positions of increased responsibility. 62  
(2) Level II (Intermediate Level) - This level is for individuals in the grades O-3 
and O-4.  At the beginning of the intermediate level, specialization is emphasized.  Later, 
individuals broaden their background towards a more general understanding of the 
overall process in their career field.  Development of the experience in the individual's 
primary career field should optimally be followed by a lateral movement to a related 
specialty.63 
(3) Level III (Advanced  Level) - This level is for individuals in grades O-4 and 
above.  By the time they reach Level III, these individuals should have completed all the 
mandatory training and education requirements up to that level.  Additionally, they 
 
 61 Government Accountability Office Report, (1993), Acquisition Management: Implementation of the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.  GAO No B-247174.  p. 1.  





                                                
should have advanced through a career path that has given them an in depth knowledge in 
their career field and a wide breadth of knowledge across the entire acquisition process.64 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU): The Defense Acquisition University 
was established on August 1, 1992.  A DAWIA initiative allowed for a joint venture 
between existing Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and DOD schools.  One of their 
primary functions was to standardize training among the different DOD acquisition 
communities.  Though the DAU consortium, the service schools would remain separate 
and distinct institutions, but certain mandatory courses would be managed centrally 
through DAU.  A small executive staff was assigned to oversee DAU operations.  Their 
duties included setting curriculum standards, registering students for courses and 
allocating training funds and classroom slots to the military services and DOD agencies.65 
Many acquisition professionals feel that DAU has made great strides in improving 
the overall quality and standardization of the acquisition workforce.  In an effort to 
expand the reach of many mandatory courses, DAU has authorized the use of satellite 
facilities and internet courses.  Many accredited universities and service schools teach 
acquisition courses whereby students earn DAWIA certification through DAU 
equivalency courses.  DAU is the proponent for the standardization of mandatory training 
which leads to DAWIA certification.  DAU, however, must first certify both the 
instructor and the course curriculum.  This is a necessary step to ensure that each 
acquisition service member receives the same quality education.  However, individual 
service schools differ through their specific acquisition courses that are not affiliated with 
DAU.   
DAWIA Certification: According to the Defense Acquisition University 
handbook, the contracting career field includes the positions of contract negotiator, 
contract specialist, contract termination specialist, contract administrator, procurement 
analyst, administrative contracting officer, procuring contracting officer, contract price 
 
64 Master, G. E. (1995). DAWIA Certification and DAU Training. Retrieved October 21, 2005, from 
www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/399AB1FD-E2DC-4066-B730-7AA503F8D122/0/DAWIA 
CertificationandDAUTraining.pps 
65 GAO Report No. B-247174. p. 15. 
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and/or construction analyst, contracting officer, and termination contracting officer.  The 
DAU hand book does not recognize contingency contracting as a separate career field. 
Certification criteria are selected from education, experience, and training 
categories.  Both the experience and training categories are required for certification 
while education is waiverable.  Some acquisition professionals feel that DAWIA 
certification has failed in its intended purpose while at the same time has done more to 
alienate the acquisition communities.  Some argue that career certification has created an 
unintended label of "professionalization", whereby acquisition members use these 
standards as career "ticket-punching".  The completion of training programs and other 
certification requirements becomes an end in itself rather than a means to improve quality 
of service.  The accompanying certificate becomes proof of professionalism.66  Appendix 
B illustrates Fiscal Year 2006 DAWIA Contracting Certification schedule.  
Contracting Certification Changes: DAU instituted changes in an attempt to 
produce contracting officers who were more business oriented.  Appendix C identifies the 
DAWIA contracting certification changes over the past seven years.  In FY-05, DAU 
instituted changes in an attempt to produce contracting officers that are more business 
oriented.  According to the FY '05 DAU Catalog: 
The Contracting career field is being transformed to meet the needs of the 
21st century AT&L workforce.....We are creating new assignment-specific 
courses, such as CON 260, The Small Business Program, as well as 
continuous learning modules suggested by our customers and making 
them accessible around the clock to meet global strategic mission needs.67 
Contingency Contracting (CON 234): The contingency contracting course is 
not currently a requirement for DAWIA certification and is not part of the DAU 
transformation effort.  However, contingency contracting is part of the curriculum in 
some of the individual services’ schools.  For example, the Army's Acquisition Basic 
Course has incorporated contingency contracting into their curriculum.  As of October 
 
66 Snider, K. (1996). DAWIA and the Price of Professionalism. Acquisition Review Quarterly. p. 102. 
67 Defense Acquisition University (2005). DAU Catalog . Retrieved August 15, 2005, from 
http://www.dau.mil/catalog/cat2005/Catalog%20Chapter%201.pdf 
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2005, the Army has requested DAU CON 234 equivalency for this course.68   As of this 
report, the decision to grant this request is still pending. 
The curriculum objectives of DAU's CON 234 are identified in Appendix D.  
These objectives offer a wide breadth of contingency contracting knowledge that will 
generally benefit junior to mid-grade officers.  However, DAU does not offer 
contingency contract training for senior level contracting officers.       
2. Analysis of Current Training: 
No DAWIA Certification: Despite the growing number of contingency 
operations, DAU has not recognized contingency contracting as a legitimate need in the 
DAWIA certification process.  Appendix C compares the DAWIA Contracting 
Certification schedules for FY 00, FY 04 and FY 06.  This comparison shows a 
transformation effort towards a more business oriented contracting posture.  This effort 
does not include contingency contracting because completion of the contingency 
contracting course is not a mandatory requirement at any level in the certification 
process.  Therefore, it is possible for a Level III Certified Contacting Officer to have no 
exposure to contingency contracting training.   
Although it is possible for contracting officers to fill a DAWIA elective 
requirement with CON 234, this choice does not often happen.  According to the DAU 
Course Catalog, electives may be any training event related to the employee's job or 
necessary for career development, or for cross training.  Electives may include no-cost 
distance learning or other training opportunities, assignment specific courses funded by 
DAU, or other training opportunities funded by the student's organization.69    
The above elective requirements criteria are very broad.  By this definition, any 
training opportunity can fulfill this requirement.  It does not mandate that electives come 
from other DAU certified courses.  This leaves the temptation for students to find the 
easiest and most direct route to certification, which may not include CON 234.   
 
68 United States Army (2005). Army Acquisition Basic Course. Retrieved October 3, 2005, from 
http://www.almc.army.mil/hsv/aabc_course_description.htm. 
69 Defense Acquisition University (2005). DAU Catalog.  
 50
Lack of a Developed Curriculum: DAU offers CON 234 as its only contingency 
contracting course across all three levels of certification.  CON 234 is not sufficient to 
cover the wide spectrum of pay grades and experience levels of our contingency 
contracting force.  As previously discussed, CON 234 benefits junior to mid-grade 
officers but there is no curriculum designed to train senior officers for positions at the 
strategic level.    
Contingency contracting curriculum must satisfy the needs of all contracting 
officers.  The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTM) provides a contingency contracting 
structure that is useful in determining the unique training needs of the differing personnel 
levels in the contingency contracting arena.  See Appendix E for a detailed description of 
the Yoder Three-Tier Model.  The YTM contends that CCOs must be groomed for 
respective positions based on experience, skill sets, and level of training.  This model 
requires a wide range of contingency contracting training that is not currently provided 
by DAU. 
CON 234 Prerequisites Restrict Student Enrollment: The current curriculum 
requires certain prerequisites prior to enrolling in CON 234.  The Contingency 
Contracting Course is only offered to students who have completed all Level I education 
requirements and the below courses: 
• CON 110 - Mission Support Planning 
• CON 111 - Mission Strategy Execution 
• CON 112 - Mission Performance  
Prior to FY05, the only prerequisite for CON 234 was CON 101 (Basics of 
Contracting).  Due to changes in the FY05 DAU contracting curriculum, prerequisites 
became more demanding.  This occurred despite an increased operational tempo that 
required more contingency contracting officers.  Through these curriculum changes, 
DAU made the contingency contracting enrollment and education process more difficult.  
Failure To Integrate Lessons Learned: It is unclear how or if DAU captures 
contingency contracting lessons learned.  The CON 234 course discusses the Joint 
Uniform Lessons Learned but does not indicate mandatory use.  It also describes each 
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service's method of capturing contingency contracting lessons learned.  In accordance 
with the CON 234 Student Guide: 
The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS) was developed to 
facilitate the evaluation of joint exercises.  It is also frequently used to 
collect after-action reports for actual operations and contingencies and is 
the most commonly used software/format for this purpose in DOD.  CCOs 
are likely to have to submit after-action data on JULLS. 
In addition to JULLS, the services and major commands often collect and 
archive additional after-action information and data.  For example, 
AFFARS Appendix CC requires all Air Force CCOs to submit after-action 
reports in a standard format to their HCA and the Air Staff subsequent to 
each deployment.  Similarly, the Army Center for Lessons Learned 
systematically collects on-site information on all major exercises and 
operations in which the Army participates. 
This statement poses a problem because there is no central agency to capture the 
contingency contracting lessons learned from each service.  DAU requires this 
information if they are to maintain a relevant CON 234 curriculum.  Currently, there are 
no systems in place to capture this data.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter took the four main deficiencies identified in Chapter II and expanded 
them to give the reader insight as to the current practices and procedures for each 
situation.  Each problem was then analyzed to identify exactly how each deficiency is 
creating inefficiencies in the contingency contracting process. 
The restrictive policies referred to in Chapter II have been mitigated by deviations 
to the current FAR.  These deviations have contributed greatly to the CCO’s efficiency.  
However, the requirement for a CCO to submit a justification letter and wait for 
authorization to apply these exemptions to each contract consumes time that the 
contractor could use to procure new requirements or to follow up on current contractor 
performance.  Additionally, dollar thresholds which act as a system of checks and 
balances are too restrictive in a contingency environment.  When these dollar thresholds 
are reached, they trigger additional administrative burdens on the CCO, reducing his or 
her effectiveness.   
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The lack of planning for contingency operations was examined from both the 
strategic and operational levels.  While planning for contingencies is required for both 
deliberate action and crisis action planning, evidence has shown that planners at the 
strategic level frequently failed to include contingency contracting in the planning 
process.  There is also a lack of experienced personnel in the upper levels of contingency 
contract planning.  In addition, it is apparent that lessons learned from past contingencies 
are not being applied to current contingencies.     
The contracting organizational structure throughout the services was examined to 
reveal completely different structures in each of the four branches of service.  Research 
also revealed that each service has recently revamped its contracting organization to 
allow for greater efficiencies in the future.  As this restructuring is fairly recent for all 
services, identification and analysis of any problems would be premature. 
The insufficient amount of CCO training was examined and revealed many 
problems with current training practices.  Despite the growing number of contingency 
operations, DAU has not recognized contingency contracting as a legitimate need in the 
DAWIA certification process.   Also, DAU offers CON 234 as its only contingency 
contracting course for DAWIA certification.  This one course is designed to satisfy the 
needs of the junior to mid-grade enlisted personnel all the way through the senior officer 
ranks.  DAU has also made the enrollment and education process more difficult by 
adding three additional prerequisites to its CON 234 course.  Finally, DAU does not 
capture nor incorporate service wide lessons learned into its contingency contracting 
curriculum.   
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter III, the four problem areas of policy, planning, organization, and 
training were analyzed in depth to illuminate their practices and procedures to identify 
the problem’s causes.  This chapter offers recommendations to each identified problem 
that should mitigate them and increase the efficiency of the contingency contracting 
officer.  This chapter also addresses general conclusions and then finishes by suggesting 
areas for further research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Policy 
Justification and Approval: The authors recommend repealing J&A 
requirements during contingencies.  Before a CCO can be authorized to operate under 
the exemptions listed in FAR 5.202(a)(2), FAR 6.302-2, FAR 33.103, and DFARS 
217.7403, the CCO must submit a justification letter for each contract and wait for 
authorization.  While the CCO can submit the letter after the procurement action has 
taken place, this requirement places an administrative burden on the CCO, causing him to 
expend time that could be used to procure new requirements or to monitor contactor 
progress on current contracts. 
The authors recommend repealing this requirement.  As one Air Force CCO 
expressed, “We are all commissioned officers who swore an oath, and we have a warrant, 
so we should be trusted until we prove otherwise.”70  Instead of requiring the CCO to 
submit a formal justification and approval for each contract, (unless a class waiver is 
issued) he or she should simply have to insert a brief narrative into the contract file 
addressing why he or she determined it necessary to award a contract under any of the 
above FAR exemptions.  Fraud, waste, and abuse is mitigated by spot inspections of the 
CCO’s contract files.  The frequent rotation of CCOs into and out of the theater also 
helps mitigate the possibility of abuse.  While this recommendation saves valuable time 
for the CCO, it is not intended to replace good business practices.  For example, if the 
 
70 Rhone, J. Capt, United States Air Force. Warranted Contracting Officer, 12th Contracting 
Squadron, Randolph AFB TX. (personal interview, November 8, 2005) 
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requirement allows for solicitation and competition, the contracting officer should take 
every step practical to ensure this happens. 
Dollar Thresholds: The authors recommend increasing the dollar thresholds 
for all purchase types during a contingency.  Dollar thresholds act as a system of 
checks and balances to monitor spending.  Current thresholds are too restrictive in 
today’s contingency contracting environment.  The following is a list of the more 
predominate thresholds in a contingency environment: 
• Simplified Acquisition Thresholds (FAR 2.101):  to support a contingency 
operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery from nuclear, 
biological, chemical, or radiological attack, Simplified Acquisition 
Threshold is $250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or 
purchase to be made, inside the United States; or $1 million for any 
contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, outside the 
United States 
• Simplified Acquisition Threshold for Commercial Items (FAR 
13.500(e)(1):  $10 million.  This threshold is part of an experimental 
program that expires on 1 January, 2009 
• Governmentwide Commercial Purchase Card (DFARS 213.301(3)):  
Limited to the amounts defined in the Simplified Acquisition Threshold 
for contingencies 
• SF 44 Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher (DFARS 213.306):  Limited to the 
amounts defined in the Simplified Acquisition Threshold for contingencies 
 
When a contract price reaches a dollar threshold, additional administrative 
requirements must be initiated to continue that procurement action.  This creates extra 
administrative burdens on the CCO that introduces inefficiencies into the procurement 
process. 
The authors recommend increasing the dollar thresholds for all purchase types 
during a contingency.  It would be irresponsible to recommend new thresholds arbitrarily 
and would require a thorough analysis of current spending which is beyond the scope of 
this project.  However, any threshold increase should be substantial enough to provide the 
CCO with the flexibility and efficiency that current thresholds currently hinder. 
 55
Service-Specific Policies: The authors recommend the publication of a joint 
contingency contracting operations manual. Service-specific policies create 
inefficiencies, particularly in a joint environment.  The individual services create their 
own policies because the FAR publishes laws and statutory regulations governing the 
federal acquisition process, but does not promulgate operational procedures.  The 
DFARS gives clarity to the FAR as it pertains to the DOD, but it also does not stipulate 
and standardize operational procedures.  While each service is entitled to enact its own 
policies within the confines of the FAR and the DFARS, the authors recommend the 
publication of a joint contingency contracting operations manual that defines standard 
contingency contracting protocol across the services.  This would ensure smooth 
integration of CCOs from different services during joint operations.  A follow on 
recommendation is to establish a common training agency to ensure CCOs from each 
service will interact effectively in a joint environment.  This recommendation is 
addressed further in the Training section of this project. 
2. Planning 
Lack of Experienced CCO Personnel: The authors recommend further 
integration and education of CCOs at the strategic planning level.  The lack of 
experienced contracting personnel in the upper levels of contingency contract planning is 
evident from past contingencies.  The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTM), (Appendix E), 
provides a potential solution for this problem.  The Yoder Three-Tier Model is a 
representation of a conceptual contingency contracting structure.  Adopting the YTM 
adequately prepares CCOs for positions in the Joint Planning and Execution Community 
(JPEC).  However, this may require the services to revamp their current contracting 
personnel structure.  This requires a manpower analysis, which is beyond the scope of 
this report.   
The highest contracting level of the YTM is the Integrated Planner and Executer 
(IPE).  The IPE is groomed by participating in contingency operations and by progressing 
up the YTM.  Since the IPE is a joint billet, the IPE must possess joint experience.  This 
is obtained from joint assignments and education such as Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) phase I & II and/or completion of a services’ War College.  Joint 
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experience will allow CCOs to leverage the functionality of each service into the 
OPLAN/CONPLAN.  Joint education provides the IPE with intra-service knowledge. 
This knowledge allows the IPE to integrate successfully with other joint staff members in 
the planning process.       
Properly preparing IPEs is often difficult because the required education and 
follow on joint billets takes a considerable amount of time away from traditional service 
specific contracting career paths.  Therefore, the services must recognize the IPE billet as 
a legitimate career path that should not adversely affect career progression.           
3. Organization 
Each service’s contingency contracting organization has made recent changes to 
their contingency contracting program because of current protracted operations, 
specifically, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Since, these 
organizational changes materialized over the past few months, quantifiable data has not 
emerged to identify deficiencies or to make recommendations.   
Establishing the proper organizational structure enables contingency contracting 
personnel to effectively accomplish their mission.  The organization is the foundation 
from which contingency contracting succeeds or fails.  Therefore, the importance of 
further research can provide valuable information for the services in carrying out future 
contingency contracting operations. 
4. Training 
Narrow focus of CCO training: The authors recommend expanding the 
contingency contracting course curriculum.  DAU must expand its contingency 
contracting course curriculum.  Contingency contracting training should be mandated at 
all three levels in the DAWIA certification process.  The Defense Acquisition University 
needs to develop an integrated contingency contracting curriculum based on the needs 
and experience levels of contracting personnel.  The only course offered (CON 234) is 
simply not sufficient to cover the wide spectrum of pay grades, skill sets and experience 
levels of our contingency contracting force.   
DAU must also carefully construct course content to eliminate the need for 
contingency contracting pre-requisite courses at each DAWIA level.  This may require 
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some minor shifting of relevant course material from other contracting classes to provide 
adequate background knowledge.  Course curriculum should be pattered after the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model and provide training for each tier, similar to the DAWIA certification 
process.  
Once incorporated, contingency contracting curriculum must remain current and 
incorporate lessons learned from recently deployed contingency contracting personnel. In 
order for this to be successful, DAU must establish itself as the centralized repository for 
all the service's lessons learned.  This information can become a valuable source from 
which training curriculum is derived.      
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon our research and analysis of the identified problems, the following 
conclusions can be made. 
Fourth Generation War (4GW) Will Change the Way Contingency 
Contracting Is Executed: During the course of our research, we have concluded that the 
dynamics and protraction of Fourth Generation War will require our military leaders to 
rethink how contingency contracting can positively impact the service members at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  Although the recent contingency contracting 
program changes are an excellent first step, the services need to continue to explore new 
and innovative ways to improve the contingency contracting process.   
The Services’ Revised Contingency Contracting Programs Will Show Mixed 
Results:  The services’ revised contingency contracting programs have been in force for 
under a year, but in spite of this relative short duration, the authors can make reasonable 
conclusions about the success or failure of these changes.  Overall, the authors conclude 
that these revisions will sustain or improve short-term operations, but may not adequately 
support longer-term operations.  For example, the Air Force has successfully filled 
contingency contracting deficiencies for other branches of the services at the tactical 
level.  Although this has proven successful in the short-term, the current Air Force 
organizational structure does not support joint endeavors for long-term use and will 
require further changes in their contingency contracting organization to foster this 
interoperability.    
 58
Contingency Contracting Officers have been Marginalized: The policies 
enacted to safe guard the contracting process have hindered the contingency contractor in 
effectively carrying out his or her mission.  Specific examples include the required 
submission of justification and approvals (J&A) for certain procurement actions which 
places unnecessary administrative burdens on the contingency contracting officer.  The 
established dollar thresholds also create inefficiencies and add to the administrative 
burden.  Lack of planning at the strategic level hampers contracting operations at the 
operational and tactical levels, thereby reducing the force multiplier effect of the 
contingency contracting officer. 
Current Training and Education is not a Force Multiplier:  DAU must 
become the Department of Defense’s centralized education and training center for 
contingency contracting officers.  Currently, other academic institutions such as the 
Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), Florida Institute of Technology (FIT) and Webster 
University offer contingency contracting training and education, however, there are no 
established certification standards for each course’s content.  The authors contend that 
DAU should be the proponent for certifying contingency contracting curriculum.  DAU 
must create, consolidate, manage, and promulgate the minimum learning objectives 
required for all contingency contracting courses while allowing other academic 
institutions to tailor their own curriculum.  However, these institutions must receive 
certification through DAU before incorporating required learning objectives.  This 
approach will generate a diverse contingency contracting workforce while ensuring all 
students have the same requisite education.  
Research has shown that there is a need for training at all levels of the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model.  This is most evident for contingency contracting officers in the upper 
echelon positions.  These personnel, referred to as the Integrated Planner and Executor 
(IPE) in the Yoder Three-Tier Model, are vital members of the COCOM staff who 
provide the necessary planning, policy, and guidance for subordinate CCOs in (or going 
into) theater.   
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Each branch of service must make a concerted effort to groom contracting officers 
for positions at the IPE level.  Contingency Contracting training alone is not sufficient.  
The IPE must possess joint experience and education.  This requires joint assignments 
and education such as JPME (phase I & II) and War College attendance.  This is 
necessary to leverage the functionality of each service and provide CCO's credibility and 
capability in the joint environment. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of our research and analysis, we identified specific topics that 
were outside the scope of this project and would require further examination to fully 
understand their impact on contingency contracting.  The following areas are: 
1.  The Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTM) has laid the foundation for establishing 
an organizational and training hierarchy for contingency contracting personnel.  In an 
effort to validate this model, an analysis of manpower requirements across all services 
would identify the applicability of implementation and pointing out where personnel 
deficiencies could be addressed. 
2.  The dollar thresholds that act as a system of checks and balances for 
procurements are too restrictive in a contingency environment.  Arbitrarily choosing 
higher thresholds would be irresponsible.  A thorough spend analysis based upon 
empirical data should be conducted to identify appropriate thresholds which would 
provide a CCO more flexibility during a contingency. 
3.  With each service having its own contracting organization and structure and 
service specific contracting policies, the effectiveness and efficiency of contracting in a 
joint environment is called into question.  The authors posed the question in Chapter III: 
“Is having a Joint contingency contracting command for coordinating the execution of 
strategic, operational, and tactical contingency contracting valid?”  Research in this area 
can potentially revolutionize the performance of contingency contracting during 
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APPENDIX A 
The Generations of War 
 
Evolution of Warfare: Understanding the evolution of warfare provides insight 
into finding solutions for future application. A review of the evolution of warfare from 
First Generation through the Third Generation War will show how dynamic the combat 
environment is and how the advancement of technology, tactics, and ideas change the 
strategic environment of warring factions71.  Changes in contingency contracting are also 
a part of this evolution and must adapt to better support the warfigher within today’s 
Fourth Generation War.  Prior to identifying the necessary changes to contingency 
contracting, it is important to understand the evolution of warfare and how contingency 
contracting fits within this context. Figure 7 shows the development of the First 
Generation War through the Second, Third, and into the Fourth Generation War.  
 
 
71 Lind, W.S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J.F., Sutton, J.W., and Wilson, G.I. (1989). The Changing 
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette.  pp. 22-26  
The “Generations of War” Model 
From the viewpoint of developed/nuclear powers 
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Figure 7.   The Generations of War Model 
Source: Richards, C. http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/conflict_years_ahead.htm 
 
Prior to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, states and non-states fought protracted 
and brutal wars.  After this treaty, warfare mainly comprised of state verses state fighting 
across a linear battlefield.  This period also had a very minute portion of guerilla warfare, 
terrorism, and criminal organizations that was marginal in scale.  Approximately three 
and a half centuries later, states verses non-states fighting has returned and dominates the 
current conduct of warfare.  Non-states use tactics of guerilla warfare and terrorism in 
their strategy for defeating state armies that are not familiar with fighting this style of 
warfare.  The current contingencies of the United States fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
are prime examples of Fourth Generation War.  The evolution of war, which 
continuously evolves, brings elements of the previous generations of war within the 
current Fourth Generation War.  In addition to the difficulties of intertwined generations 
of war has on prosecuting the war, it also adds difficulty to the execution of contingency 
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war will explain how warfare has evolved over time. The Fourth Generation War is 
explained in Chapter II of this report.   
First Generation of War: The First Generation of War (1GW) began with the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.  After this peace agreement, fighting occurred between 
states in generally an orderly way.72  States assumed a monopoly on war, which pitched 
army verse army in a battle of opposing wills.  Troops fired smooth bore muskets from a 
massed position of lines and columns at their adversaries.  The soldiers fought on a linear 
battlefield that defined friendly and enemy territory.  The U.S. Revolutionary War is a 
prime example of 1GW.  As technology, tactics, and ideas changed, a new generation of 
war emerged.73   
Second Generation of War: The French Army developed Second Generation of 
War (2GW) before and during WWI. The transition to 2GW is identified by massing of 
firepower instead of the massing of troops.  The lateral dispersion of troops marked a 
small change from the first generation, but technology was a greater contributor.  
Technological advances of the rifled musket, machine guns, indirect fire from artillery, 
and aircraft fighters and bombers were the primary drivers from the first generation.74  
The French Army had a centralized command and control structure synchronizing 
available firepower.  They focused their attention internally on methods, techniques, and 
discipline.75 The orderly conduct of warfare continued through the Second Generation as 
well.   
Third Generation of War: The German Army developed tactics representing the 
Third Generation of War (3GW), referred to as maneuver warfare, during WWI.  Fire and 
maneuver was a dominant tactic along with a decentralized decision-making process.  
Frontline commanders had more flexibility to make decisions as the situation dictated.  
By focusing outward on the enemy rather than inward on rules and strict order, decisions 
 
72 Lind, W.S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War.  Retrieved October 3, 2008, from 
http://antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702, January 15, 2004 
73 Lind, W.S., et. al. (1989).  pp. 22-26  
74 Ibid 
75 Lind, W.S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War.  
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are made more quickly, enabling increased tempo during battle.76  The transition into 
Fourth Generation of War can be contributed by political, social, and economic factors.77     
 
76 Lind, W.S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War.  
77 Hammes, T.X., The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation, Marine Corps Gazette, September 
1994.  p. 27. 
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APPENDIX B 
2006 DAWIA Contracting Certification Schedule 
(Source: 2006 Defense Acquisition University Catalog) 
 
  Education  Experience Training 
Level I  • Baccalaureate Degree               
• At least 24 hours among: accounting, 
law, business finance, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial 
management, marketing, quantitative 
methods, organization and management   
• 1 year of contracting 
experience  
• CON 100 Shaping Smart 
Business Arrangements           
• CON 110 Mission Support 
Planning 
• CON 111 Mission Strategy 
Execution 
• CON 112 Mission 
Performance Assessment 
• CON 120 Mission Focused 
Contracting 
• 1 Elective   
Level II • Baccalaureate Degree               
• At least 24 hours among: accounting, 
law, business finance, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial 
management, marketing, quantitative 
methods, organization and management   
• (Desired) Graduate studies in business 
administration or procurement                  
• 2 year of contracting 
experience                               
• (Desired) An additional 2 
year of contracting 
experience  
• CON 202 Intermediate 
Contracting                              
• CON 204 Intermediate 
Contract Pricing                       
• CON 210 Government 
Contract Law                          
• 2 Electives   
Level III • Baccalaureate Degree              
• At least 24 hours among: accounting, 
law, business finance, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial 
management, marketing, quantitative 
methods, organization and management   
• At least 10 years acquisition 
experience (as of 1 Oct 1991)                   
• (Desired) Master's Degree  in 
business administration or procurement   
• 4 year of contracting 
experience                           
• (Desired) An additional 4 
year of contracting 
experience  
• CON 353 Advanced 
Business Solutions for 
Mission Support 
• 2 Electives                             
• (Desired) 2 weeks of 
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APPENDIX C 
DAWIA Contracting Certification Requirements 
(Source: 2001,'04 & '06 Defense Acquisition University Catalogs) 
 
 FY 00 FY 04 FY 06 
Level I • CON 101 Basics of 
Contracting                                  
• CON 104 Principles of 
Contract Pricing                            
Through 30 June 04 
• CON 100 Shaping Smart 
Business Arrangements                   
• CON 101 Basics of Contracting   
• CON 104 Principles of Contract 
Pricing                            
• 1 Elective   
• (Desired) CON 237 Simplified 
Acquisition Procedures   
After 1 July  04 
• CON 100 Shaping Smart 
Business Arrangements                   
• CON 1XX Introductory 
Contracting and Pricing Models 
• CON 120 Negotiation 
Workshop and Level 1 Wrap up 
• (Desired) CON 237 Simplified 
Acquisition Procedures 
• CON 100 Shaping Smart 
Business Arrangements             
• CON 110 Mission Support 
Planning 
• CON 111 Mission Strategy 
Execution 
• CON 112 Mission 
Performance Assessment 
• CON 120 Mission Focused 
Contracting 
• 1 Elective   
Level II • CON 202 Intermediate 
Contracting                                  
• CON 204 Intermediate 
Contract Pricing                          
• CON 210 Government 
Contract Law                                
• CON 202 Intermediate 
Contracting                                   
• CON 204 Intermediate Contract 
Pricing                           
• CON 210 Government Contract 
Law                                
• 2 Electives   
• CON 202 Intermediate 
Contracting                                
• CON 204 Intermediate 
Contract Pricing                         
• CON 210 Government 
Contract Law                             
• 2 Electives   
Level III • CON 301 Executive 
Contracting                                  
• CON 333 Management for 
Contract Supervisors                      
• (Desired) 2 weeks of 
management and leadership 
training 
• CON 353 Advanced Business 
Solutions for Mission Support 
• 2 Electives                                 
• (Desired) 2 weeks of 
management and leadership 
training 
• CON 353 Advanced 
Business Solutions for 
Mission Support 
• 2 Electives                               
• (Desired) 2 weeks of 
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APPENDIX D 
2006 DAU CON 234 Course Objectives 
(Source: 2006 Defense Acquisition University Catalog) 
 
Objective Identify and apply contracting laws, regulations, and procedures 
for contingencies 
 Apply ethical principles in procurement decisions in foreign 
environments 
 Identify key personnel and organizations in contingencies, explain 
their roles and responsibilities, and illustrate required coordination. 
 Summarize and discuss elements of contingency contracting 
support planning 
 Assess customer requirements and execute appropriate 
procurement actions 
 Prepare, assemble, administer, and close out contracts, documents, 
files, and reports 
 Recognize cross-cultural behavior patterns and 
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APPENDIX E 
The Yoder Three-Tier Model 
INTRODUCTION 
 The Yoder Three-Tier Model provides a representation of a conceptual 
contingency contracting structure.  Although it has not been instituted, the Army has 
adopted a personnel structure that closely resembles the Yoder Model.  Table 9 at the end 
of this appendix provides a detailed description of the Yoder Three-Tier Model.  
The Yoder Three-Tier Model is based on the premise of three distinct personnel 
levels in the contingency contracting arena. 
• Ordering Officer 
• Leveraging Contracting Officer 
• Integrated Planner and Executer 
Personnel within each level are groomed for their respective position based on 
experience, skill sets and level of training.  Each tier is co-dependent, or integrated in a 
hierarchal manner, on the other tiers.78    
Ordering Officer (OO): This is the lowest level in the Yoder Three-Tier Model.  
The Ordering Officer performs the basic ordering functions for the buying activity.  Their 
duties include simple buys and are generally not involved in the contractual formulation 
process.  They mainly order against contracts that are already established such as blanket 
purchase agreements and impress funds.  Ordering Officers are an important part of the 
contingency contracting process because they provide a majority of the buying actions 
after the contracts are in place.   
The Ordering officer should possess at least a DAWIA Level I Contracting 
Certification.  Additionally, they should have taken the Defense Acquisition University's 
CON 234 course (Contingency Contracting), or equivalent.  This level is best suited for 
junior to mid-enlisted or a junior officer. 
 
78 Yoder, E. C., (2004). The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning 
and Execution. (Working Paper NPS-AM-05-2002, Naval Postgraduate School,.2004). p. 1. 
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Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO):  This is the middle level in the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model.  The Leveraging Contracting Officer has more authority and 
responsibility than the Ordering Officer.  The LCO is responsible for filling the gap 
between organic logistic support and unfulfilled organizational requirements. 
Contracting Personnel at this level are well versed in all Ordering Officer 
functions and responsibilities.  They must "leverage" their buying activity's requirements 
onto the local economy in the contingency area.  As such, CCOs interface with local and 
regional businesses and may be required to coordinate with higher military organizations, 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), or political organizations.79   
The LCO should possess a DAWIA Level II or Level III Contracting 
Certification.  If they have not completed CON 234 as an ordering officer, it is required at 
this level.  Additionally, LCOs should complete an undergraduate or graduate level of 
business education. LCOs are normally senior enlisted or junior to mid-grade officer. 
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE):  This is the highest level in the Yoder 
Three-Tier Model.  The IPE is a contracting officer who provides the link between the 
Combatant Command (COCOM) and the operational level units.  Their main 
responsibility is to formulate the necessary strategy and establish contracting policy in the 
theater of operation. 
The IPE provides the necessary contract planning input into the contingent 
OPLAN.  They are a vital member of the COCOM staff who provides the necessary 
guidance for the LCO and ordering officers in (or going into) theater.   
The IPE is groomed from experience contracting tours within the lower tiers of 
the Yoder Model.  Since the IPE is a joint billet, the IPE must possess joint experience.  
This is obtained from joint assignments and education such as JPME (phase I & II) and 
War College attendance.  This is necessary to leverage the functionality of each service 
into the OPLAN/CONPLAN. 
 
79 Yoder, E. C., (2004).  p. 14. 
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Currently, there is no formal contingency contract training available for the IPE.  
However, the IPE must have at least a master's level education in a business related field.  
Only senior level officers (O-6+) should serve as IPEs.          
ISSUES 
 Implementing the Yoder Three tier model would require Chairman of the Joint 
Chief's of Staff support.  With the exception of the Army, this model involves manpower 
revisions in the personnel structure within the services.  In order to gain maximum 
efficiency, this model would require uniform implementation across the services.  
Otherwise, each service will put their own bias on the required experience, skill sets and 
level of training.  This could degrade the overall effectiveness of the model.         
There is a void in education at LCO and IPE levels.  DAU has one course (CON 
234) for all contingency contracting officers.  This course is sufficient only at the 
ordering officer level.  In order for the Yoder Three Tier model to be effective, education 
for the LCO and IPE levels must be developed. 
The current military structure does not facilitate sufficient grooming of IPEs.  
Proper education and joint experience tours will prepare contracting officers for IPE 
positions.  This is often difficult because this takes a considerable amount of time away 
from the traditional, service specific contracting career paths.  However, this is necessary 
to produce qualified upper level CCOs. 
CONCLUSION   
The Yoder Three-Tier Model provides a solid baseline for the contingency 
contracting structure across the services.  This model provides the necessary guidance for 
experience, required skill sets and levels of training.  However, implementing the Yoder 
model must be a top down driven joint requirement for all the services to adopt.  This will 








Table 9.   
 
 The Yoder Three-Tier Model 
(Source – "The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and 
Execution of Contingency Contracting) 
 




Highlights and Drawbacks 
 
Ordering Officer—Tier One 
 
• basic ordering 
• some simplified 
   acquisitions 
• training: DAU CON 234 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
   Level I or II 
• junior to mid-enlisted, 
  junior officers, GS-7 to         
GS-9, 1102 series         
civilians 
 
• simple buys 
• little integration 
• no operational planning 





• leverages to local 
  economy 
• reduces “pushed" 
 material support 
• training/education: 
• DAU CON 234, 
  recommended higher 
  education 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
  Level II or III 
• senior enlisted, junior to 
 mid-grade officers, GS-          
11+ 1102 series civilians 
 
• better local operational 
  planning 
• some integration 
• more capability for the 
  operational commander 
• no planned theater 
  integration 
• no broad liaison functions 
• may perform to optimize 
  local operations at the 
  detriment to theater ops 
 
Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE)—Tier Three 
 
• highest level of planning 
  and integration—joint 
  linked/integrated with J-          
and J-5 
• creates and executes 
  OPLAN CCO strategy 
• provides direction to tier 
  two and one 
• links operations 
  strategically to theater 
  objectives of COCOM 
• education: Master’s          
degree or higher and,    
JPME Phase I and II 
• DAWIA Certified CON 
  Level III, and other             
DAWIA disciplines  
  (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) 
• senior officers (0-6+), 
  senior civilians, GS-13+      
or SES 
• performs operational and 
  theater analysis,    integrates 
results into OPLAN 
• link between COCOM and 
  OPLAN to all theater 
  contracting operations 
• coordinates theater 
  objectives with best 
  approach to contracted 
  support 
• can achieve broader 
  national security goals 
  through effective 
  distribution of national 
  assets 
• includes planning, 
  communication, 
  coordination, and 
  exercising with NGO and 
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